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Jatkuva maapallon väkiluvun ja energiatarpeen kasvu ovat johtaneet maailman 
energiakriisiin. Vanhat energialähteet ovat käymässä vähiin ja siirtyminen uusiutuvien 
energiamuotojen käyttöön on alkanut. Nykyinen sähköverkko on tehoton ja vanha eikä 
pysty täyttämään nykypäivän vaatimuksia. Yhtenä vaihtoehtona näiden ongelmien 
ratkaisemiseen on hyödyntää kaksisuuntaista sähkön ja informaation kulkua, jota 
kutsutaan myös Smart Gridiksi. Koska Smart Grid hyödyntää informaatio- ja 
kommunikaatioteknologioita, altistuu se myös tietoturvauhkille. Smart Grid koostuu 
useista osajärjestelmistä luoden monimutkaisen automaatioympäristön. Smart Gridin 
turvaaminen on tästä syystä hankalaa, mutta pakollista, sillä onnistuneiden hyökkäysten 
seuraukset voivat olla katastrofaalisia. Tämä diplomityö on osa CLEEN SHOK Smart 
Grids and Energy Markets -projektia tutkien Smart Grid -demonstraatioympäristön 
tietoturvallisuutta. Työn päätavoitteina ovat analysoida ja testata Smart Grid -
implementaation tietoturvallisuutta ja luoda tietoturvatarkastuslista eri yrityksille, jotka 
toimivat Smart Grid -ympäristössä.  
Tämä diplomityö on jaettu neljään osaan. Kirjallisuustutkimuksessa esitellään 
tietoturvallisuuskäsitteitä ja -ympäristöä sekä Smart Gridiä yleisellä tasolla. Tämä vaihe 
tutustuttaa lukijan myös Smart Grid -käsitemalliin sekä -demonstraatioympäristöön. 
Analyysivaiheessa demonstraatioympäristöä eritellään uhkamallinnusta käyttäen ja 
tutkien demonstraatiolaitteita tarkemmin. Uhkamallinnus on tehty asiakkaan 
näkökulmasta ja se tarjoaa korkean abstraktitason analyysin, siinä missä 
demonstraatiolaitteiden tarkastelu tarjoaa syvän, laitteistoläheisen analyysin. 
Testausvaiheessa demonstraatiolaitteisto testataan ja testauksen tulokset esitetään. Tämä 
vaihe sisältää testaussuunnitelman ja siinä käytettävät testausohjelmat. Viimeisessä 
osassa esitetään tarkastuslista. Tämä tarkistuslista tarjoaa 10 parasta kriittistä 
tietoturvakontrollia, mitkä soveltuvat erityisesti kotiautomaatioympäristöön.  
Tutkimus osoittaa, että demonstraatioympäristö sisältää tietoturvapuutteita. 
Yleisimmät haavoittuvuudet johtuvat ohjelmien vääristä asetuksista sekä versioista, 
jotka sisältävät tietoturvauhkia. Demonstraatioympäristön tärkein osa on ThereGate, 
joka on myös kuluttajien käyttöliittymä Smart Gridiin. Kyseinen laite sisältää monta 
vakavaa tietoturvaongelmaa, jotka täytyy korjata. ThereGaten suojaaminen on oleellisen 
tärkeää koko systeemin toimivuuden ja turvallisuuden kannalta.   
Smart Gridin luotettavan toiminnan turvaaminen vaatii tietoturvallisempia 
menettelyjä, kuten asiakkaan vahva tunnistaminen. Niin kauan kuin standardit 
pelkästään suosittelevat eivätkä pakota tietoturvamekanismien käyttöä, kuten tiedon 
salaamista, ei niitä käytetä. Työn tuloksena voidaan sanoa Smart Gridin luotettavan 
toiminnan varmistamisen vaativan lisää toiminnan luotettavuuteen tähtäävää 
tietoturvatutkimusta. 
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The ever growing population and need for energy has culminated in an energy crisis. 
Old, traditional energy sources are running low and the transition to renewable ones has 
begun. The electric grid, however, is very old, being inefficient and incapable of meet-
ing the needs of today. One solution for these problems is to utilize a two-way flow of 
electricity and information, also known as Smart Grid. As Smart Grid utilizes informa-
tion and communications technology, it will be exposed to information security threats. 
Smart Grid comprises of many systems, creating a complex automation environment. 
Thus, even if making Smart Grid secure is troublesome, it is essential to ensure its secu-
rity since the consequences of successful attacks can be disastrous. This thesis is part of 
CLEEN SHOK Smart Grids and Energy Markets project and studies the information 
security of the Smart Grid demonstration environment. The main goals are to analyze 
and test the information security of the Smart Grid implementation, and to generate a 
best practice information security checklist for different players in the Smart Grid envi-
ronment. 
 The thesis is divided into four phases. In the literature study the focus is on infor-
mation security landscape and features, as well as Smart Grid on general level. This 
phase includes a presentation of the conceptual model of Smart Grid and the demonstra-
tion environment on a general level. In the analysis demonstration environment is ana-
lyzed through threat modelling and closer examination of the demonstration equipment. 
The threat model works from the customer´s point of view, concentrating on home en-
ergy management system, and providing high abstract level analysis, whereas the ex-
amination of the equipment provides more specific analysis. In the testing, the demon-
stration environment is tested, and the results are presented. This phase also includes the 
testing layout and introduces the software used for the testing. The final section focuses 
on generating a best practice security list. This checklist provides the top 10 critical con-
trols of information security for the Smart Grid environment, especially for a home 
automation environment. 
In the course of the study, it is indicated that the information security of the demon-
stration environment has shortages. The most common vulnerabilities are due to wrong 
software configurations, and using vulnerable versions of software. The most critical 
part of the demonstration environment is the end user's device, which in this study was 
ThereGate. This equipment has many security issues that need to be taken care of. Se-
curing ThereGate is essential in regard to the entire system's dependability and security. 
To secure dependable Smart Grid, stronger methods like strong client authentication 
are required. As long as standards only recommend and do not require information secu-
rity methods, like encryption, they will not be used, and thus, they will make the system 
more vulnerable. As a result, it can be said that more security research is required in 
order to secure a dependable Smart Grid.   
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 
3G    3
rd
 generation mobile telecommunications. 
 
Aggregator An aggregator is a centralized information source quite 
like SCADA, that aggregates information from various 
sources. 
 
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructures are systems that 
measure, collect, and analyse energy usage and communi-
cate with metering devices.  
 
Anonymous   Name for famous hacker or hacktivist group. 
 
ANSI    American National Standards Institute. 
 
API Application Programming Interface is a language and 
message format that software programs can use to com-
municate with the operating system or some other control 
program. It is an interface between different software pro-
grams.  
 
ARP Address Resolution Protocol is used for matching IP ad-
dresses to MAC addresses, when IP protocol is used.  
 
BAN Building Area Network is a network in customer premises 
connecting devices to each other. A type of LAN.  
 
Blowfish Blowfish is a strong symmetric block cipher. The key 
length varies from 32 bits to 448 bits.  
 
C12.22 C12.22 is the American National Standard for Protocol 
Specification for Interfacing to Data Communication 
Networks.  
 
CA Certificate Authority, an entity that issues digital certifi-
cates. 
 
CIA    Central Intelligence Agency. 
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CIA Confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The core prin-
ciples of information security.  
 
CM     Configuration Management. 
  
CPU    Central Processing Unit 
 
CSIv2    Common Secure Interoperability Version 2  
 
CSRF Cross-site request forgery is an attack, which forces an 
end user to execute unwanted actions on a web applica-
tion in which she or he is authenticated. 
 
DCS Distributed Control Systems. 
 
DES  Data Encryption Standard, a block cipher that uses shared 
secret encryption. The length of the block is 64 bits and 
key length is 56 bits. Due the length of the key, DES is 
not used widely anymore. Triple-DES has taken its place. 
 
DLMS/COSEM Device Language Message specification/Companion 
Specification for Energy Metering is the common lan-
guage of Automatic Meter Reading, or Demand Side 
Management.  
 
DMS Distribution Management System is a collection of appli-
cations used to monitor, and control the distribution 
power system reliability, and efficiency.  
 
DMZ Demilitarized zone is an information security method. It is 
physical or logical subnetwork that connects company´s 
external services to entrusted network.  
 
DNS Domain Name System is a naming system for computers, 
services or other resource connected to the network. It 
changes hostnames into IP addresses.  
 
DoS  Denial-of-service is a situation, where resources and ser-
vices are unavailable to intended users. 
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DSO Distribution System Operator operates the distribution 
systems, which purpose is to distribute power from the 
transmission network to customers. 
 
DSR Demand Side Response is a modification of consumer 
demand for energy. The goal is to encourage consumers to 
use less energy during peak hours, or move the use of en-
ergy to off-peak times.  
 
Easter Eggs   Intentionally hidden information, such as pictures.  
 
EMS Energy Management System is a system of computer-
aided tools used by operators of electric utility grids to 
monitor, control, and optimize the performance of the 
generation and/or transmission system. 
 
ESI Energy Service Interface is the primary service interface 
to the Customer domains, and it communicates with other 
domains via the AMI infrastructure, or via, for example, 
the Internet. It provides a secure interface for Utility-to-
Consumer interactions, and can act as a bridge to facility-
based systems, such as the customer‘s energy manage-
ment system. 
 
EU    European Union. 
 
FAN Field Area Network is a network that includes devices 
communicating between the individual service connec-
tions, and backhaul points leading to the utility. It also in-
cludes distribution automation and control devices. 
 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service is a packet oriented mobile 
data service that works in GSM network.  
 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications is a global 
cellular network.  
 
GUI Graphical UI is a type of user interface that uses images 
instead of text commands to interact with users.  
 
HAN Home Area Network is a network in customer premises 
connecting devices to each other. A type of LAN.   
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HEMS Home Energy Management System is an interface for 
customer resources as well as UI for customers to Smart 
Grid. It includes both ESI, and customer´s ESM. 
 
Home PNA Is a technology for home networking over the existing 
coaxial cables and telephone wiring.  
 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol is a networking protocol used 
by the WWW for the data communication. It defines how 
Web servers and browsers should respond to various 
commands, and how messages are formatted and transmit-
ted.  
 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secured is a combination of 
HTTP and SSL/TLS protocols used for secure transmis-
sion of information.  
 
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol is one of the core pro-
tocols of the TCP/IP.  
 
ICS Industrial Control System is a general term that encom-
passes several types of control systems, such as SCADA 
and DCS systems.  
 
ICT Information and Communication Technology is a system 
consisting of equipment and networks, which are used to 
treat information.  
 
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm is a symmetric 
block cipher. It operates on 64 bit blocks using 128 bit 
key.  
 
IDS Intrusion Detection System is a system that monitors the 
network, looking for suspicious behaviour, and alerting of 
an attack.  
 
IEC    International Electrotechnical Commission 
 
IP Internet Protocol is the principle communications proto-
col, which takes care of transmitting packets.  
 
x 
 
IPS Intrusion prevention system is network security software 
that monitors the network and system for malicious activ-
ity.   
 
IPSec A security protocol that authenticates and/or encrypts 
each IP packet.  
 
ISO Independent Systems Operators is an organization that 
controls and monitors the operation of the electrical power 
system within a single or multiple states in USA. 
 
ISP The Internet Service Provider is a company that provides 
access to the Internet.  
 
IT Information Technology is a system that handles informa-
tion. 
 
JDBC Java Database Connectivity is an interface that defines a 
way in which customers can use a database.  
 
JSON JavaScript Object Notation is a lightweight data-
interchange format, which is easy for humans to read and 
write, and easy for machines to parse and generate.  
 
LAN Local Area Network is a computer network covering a 
small physical area. 
 
LTE    Long Term Evolution is evolution of 3G technology.  
 
LV    Low Voltage. Less than 1 kV.  
 
MAC Message Authentication Code is a unique hardware ad-
dress that identifies each node of a network.  
 
M-Bus A light-weight local coordination protocol providing a 
simple and flexible message oriented communication 
channel for a group of components. 
 
MID    Measuring Instrument Directive. 
 
MITM A man-in-the-middle attack is one in which the adversary 
intercepts communications between two parties.  
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MOF    Managed Object Framework 
 
MV    Medium voltage. Less than 50 kV. 
 
ANSI C12.18 ANSI C12.18 is an ANSI standard that describes a proto-
col used for two-way communications with an electricity 
meter. Used mostly in North America.  
 
NAT Network Address Translation. A process of modifying IP 
address information in IP packet headers, while in transit 
across a traffic touring device.  
 
NE3S/WS   Nokia Enhanced SNMP Solution Suite/Web Service.  
 
NIST     National Institution of Standards and Technology 
 
OCoS    Open Configuration Data Standard. 
 
OES Open EMS Suite is an element management system 
(EMS) platform product providing operation and mainte-
nance interface solutions.  
 
OMeS    Open Measurement Standard. 
 
OPC UA OPC Unified Architecture is the most recent OPC specifi-
cation.  
 
OPC Openness, Productivity, and Collaboration is an open 
source data transfer standard, which is used in automation 
systems.  
 
OS    Operating System. 
 
OSI- model   Open System Interconnection Reference Model 
 
PAN Premise Area Network is a network in customer premises 
connecting devices to each other. A type of LAN. 
 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy is a computer program that provides 
more security by public key encryption and authentica-
tion. It is used, especially, with E-mails.  
 
xii 
 
PHP Hypertext Preprocessor is a programming language used 
especially in Web server environment.  
 
PKI    Public Key Infrastructure is a digital certificate scheme.  
 
PLC Power Line Communication is a data transmission system 
that uses the existing power lines within a home, building, 
or an outdoor power distribution network.  
 
PM    Performance Management. 
 
RC4 RC4 is a widely used symmetric encryption algorithm.  
 
RC5    RC5 is a simple block cipher.  
 
RF    Radio Frequency 
 
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension is a stan-
dard, which defines encryption and signing of e-mails by 
using public key cryptography.   
 
SAN Substation Area Network is a network that includes de-
vices such as capacitor banks and relays, communicating 
inside a single electric substation. 
 
SANS SANS is an institute that is most trusted, and by far the 
largest source for information security training, and secu-
rity certification in the world 
 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition refers to the 
automation system used to monitor, and control industrial 
process 
 
SGEM   Smart Grid for Energy Market 
 
SGWC   Smart Grid Working Croup 
 
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol is a protocol specification 
for exchanging structured information in Web Services.  
 
SPKI Simple Public Key Infrastructure is a specification for 
digital certificate scheme. 
xiii 
 
SQL Structured Query Language is a programming language 
designed for managing data.  
 
SSH Secure Shell is a network protocol for secure data com-
munication, remote shell services, or command execution.  
 
SSL Secure socket layer is a cryptographic protocol that pro-
vides security for communications over networks such as 
the Internet. 
 
TCP    Transmission Control Protocol 
 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol is the set 
of communication protocols used for the Internet. The 
name comes from the most important protocols in the set: 
Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol. 
 
TLS Transport Layer Security is a cryptographic protocol that 
provides security for communications over networks such 
as the Internet. 
 
TNS Transparent Network Substrate is an Oracle computer 
networking technology for peer-to-peer connectivity.  
 
TPM Trusted Platform Module is a secure cryptographic proc-
essor that offers secure generation and storing of crypto-
graphic keys, and limitation of their use. 
 
Triple-DES  Triple Data Encryption Algorithm is a block cipher that 
uses DES cipher algorithm three times to each data block. 
 
TSO Transmission System Operator is a non-commercial or-
ganization – usually at least partly owned by the state or 
government – responsible for an area to be electrically 
stable, and for the security of supply in this area. 
 
UDP User Datagram Protocol is one of the core protocols of the 
TCP/IP. 
 
UI User Interface is a place where interaction between human 
and computer occurs.  
 
xiv 
 
UPnP Universal Plug and Play is a set of networking protocols, 
the purpose of which is to make different kinds of equip-
ment to work easily together.  
  
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network is a group of hosts with re-
quirements that communicate as if they were attached to 
the same broadcast domain, regardless of their physical 
location. 
 
VPN Virtual Private Network is a way for combining two or 
more networks into a private network over a public net-
work.  
 
WAN Wide Area Network is a computer network that covers a 
broad area. 
 
WLAN   Wireless Local Area Network. 
 
WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access is security protocol used for se-
curing wireless computer networks.    
 
WS Web Service is a method which enables the communica-
tion between two computers over network.  
 
X.509    A standard for a PKI.  
 
XML eXtensible Mark-up Language is an open standard used 
for defining data elements on a WWW- document. 
Whereas HTML defines how elements are displayed, 
XML defines what they contain. 
 
XSS Cross-Site Scripting is a type of vulnerability that enables 
attacker to inject client-side script into web pages.  
 
Z-Wave A wireless communication protocol designed for home 
automation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The number of people, and moreover, the consumption of energy is increasing in an 
unstoppable manner. Covering this rise in demand with scarce, traditional, fossil based 
energy sources is a short sighted solution and only enhance the other big problem – 
global warming. This situation is forcing us towards energy efficient, and more ecologi-
cal production as well as transmission of energy. In the last few years renewable energy 
sources, such as wind and solar power, have become a real option in energy production. 
However, the current electric grid is old and not planned or capable of utilizing renewa-
ble energy sources that well. One solution to these problems is a new electric grid called 
―Smart Grid‖, which changes the power generation from a centralized one to a decentra-
lized one. Smart Grid modernizes today‘s one-way electricity delivering system into a 
highly automated and dynamic system by exploiting two-way flow of electricity and 
information. The layout of the Smart Grid is a multi-connected network instead of the 
more traditional tree model. However, as the new grid utilizes information technology 
(IT) and is more complex, it will be also exposed to new kinds of information security 
threats. Information security concerns are not restricted only to deliberate attacks but 
also situations such as natural disasters. The consequences of what might happen if an 
attacker penetrates a network can be severe. Thus, information security must be taken 
into account from the beginning into the very end. 
This thesis studies information security in Smart Grid demonstration environment at 
Tampere University of Technology (TUT) and is a part of Smart Grid for Energy Mar-
ket (SGEM). The SGEM is a CLEEN SHOK (Cluster for Energy and Environment/ 
Concentration of strategic top-level knowhow) program, and its objective is to create an 
innovation foundation for new solutions, products, and services to enable the implemen-
tation of the Smart Grid´s vision. The target of Task 6.2 is to ensure the dependability, 
integrity, confidentiality, and reliability of the new information and communications 
technology (ICT) architectures, and solutions for Smart Grid. The main goals of this 
thesis are to present a way of analyzing and testing information security of Smart Grid 
demonstration environment, and generate a best practice checklist for information secu-
rity. The purpose of the checklist is to work as a tool on information security for differ-
ent players, especially in the home automation environment of Smart Grid.  
There are four phases in this thesis. The first phase, including chapters two and 
three, introduces the concept of information security in automation and presents Smart 
Grid on a general level, giving necessary background information to the reader. This 
phase also includes a presentation of the conceptual model of Smart Grid as well as the 
demonstration environment on a general level. The second phase, consisting of chapters 
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four and five, analyzes the demonstration environment through threat modeling and 
through a closer examination of the demonstration equipment. The threat model takes 
the customer´s point of view and concentrates on the home energy management system, 
providing high-level analysis, whereas the examination of the equipment provides more 
specific analysis. The third phase is the actual testing part where the demonstration en-
vironment will be tested using several different testing software. The testing and its re-
sults are performed in chapter six. The last phase of the thesis concludes the results in 
the form of a checklist for the best security practices. This checklist provides the top 10 
critical controls of information security, especially for home automation environment 
and is presented in chapter seven. 
 
 
 
 
 3 
2 INFORMATION SECURITY 
The aim of this chapter is to give necessary background information on information 
security, especially in automation environments, such as Smart Grid. Defining the con-
cept of information security with its objectives, as well as introducing the special needs 
of the automation system are vital for a deeper comprehension.  
In this chapter, it will also be presented which kinds of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
attacks the digital world possesses, and who are the possible adversaries in Smart Grid 
environment. Other issues discussed include fighting against the adversaries´ attacks, 
security measures, and security testing techniques. 
2.1 Landscape 
Until recently, information security in automation systems, such as energy distribution 
systems, has been disregarded since there were no real threats to be considered. The 
environment was to a great extent closed and so the programs and protocols, that is eve-
rything, was designed for that environment. Nowadays however, the environment has 
changed from closed to open, and information security cannot simply be bypassed. In-
stead, it requires special attention and deep understanding. The consequences of what 
might happen if the automation system was hacked can be hazardous. [1, p. 152; 2, p. 
28.] 
There has also been a significant change in the hacking culture and procedures. 
Whereas hackers used to work alone, they now work as a group. In such a group one 
person can search for vulnerabilities, another can make exploits, and the next one can 
combine all these to one package while the last one uses the package to make money for 
all the participants. Nowadays, the systems are simply too complex for one individual to 
handle. For this reason, many hacking forums have been created where one can find 
information, join a group, or learn how to hack something. [3.] In addition the so-called 
normal and widely used virtual societies, such as YouTube [4], include a cornucopia of 
different tutorials for hacking.  
Not only has the hacking culture changed but the tools for hacking have also 
evolved: there are now network discovery and vulnerability scanners, penetration tools, 
network monitoring tools, brute force tools, and social engineering tools that collect 
information from different public sources to create information packages from individu-
als, -and so forth. For some, it may seem surprising that one of these tools, a very pow-
erful and used one, is Google. It can be used, for instance, to find vulnerabilities [5]. 
The motives behind the attacks vary from money to curiosity, and reputation to ideol-
ogy. The denial-of-service- attacks (DoS), for instance, where the goal of the attack is to 
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make resources and services unavailable to users, are one way to blackmail money from 
companies. Hacking into companies' systems in order to find classified information has 
also grown [1, pp. 21-26].  
Nowadays, people are more and more connected and attached to the Internet than 
ever before. Having a virtual-identity is almost a must, at least on some level. People are 
more careless in regard to what they publish about themselves in Internet societies, and 
what terms they agree with when joining. Following this progress closely, adversaries 
have adopted new ways to attack: social engineering, and phishing emails have become 
very common [3, p. 6]. Even if badly written emails may seem a cheap trick to fall into, 
many people still do. There is no overestimating the curiosity and general laziness of 
people.  
Moreover, the amount of information gathered from each individual has grown a 
great deal. Facebook, for example, uses cookies in a way that enables them to track the 
pages that a subscriber visits, even when logged out [6]. Third party service providers, 
however, are not the only ones to track people´s actions – governments do it as well. 
Every laser printer, for instance, leaves a unique trace that can be used to track down the 
owner of the printer if necessary. Although this may seem harmless, especially to peo-
ple who have nothing to hide, it is a matter of freedom against control. [7.] The recent 
incidents in Norway catalysed a conversation about the necessity of increasing surveil-
lance online. However, giving more rights to the government is not necessarily the best 
solution from the citizen's point of view. This can be seen, for example, in China, where 
the government monitors and restricts Internet usage [8]. All this raises concerns about 
privacy, legislation, and consumer security. How much responsibility for information 
security can be left to end users, and can we trust the government of today and the one 
of the future?  
An important part of Smart Grid will be the new technological solution that can be 
used to improve the system. These technologies are important but also increase the at-
tack surface of the system. For example, as the electric cars implement operating sys-
tems (OS) and applications [9], they can be used to gain access to the network of the 
local electricity supplier via, for instance, a car´s battery system. Additionally, devices 
such as smart phones, will be involved in more attacks either as a target, or as a means 
to access another system. These factors shape the landscape of information security in 
Smart Grid to a very complex and vast one. 
2.2 Definition and objectives 
One issue worth clarifying is the concept of information security. There exists a myriad 
of opinions and beliefs of what information security is, and it is often seen only as a 
technical solution. Information security is, nevertheless, much more than a personal 
firewall.  
The environment of Smart Grid is not a simple IT environment, but instead, a com-
plex automation environment. Thus, the information security of Smart Grid follows 
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closely the information security of automation. Information security of automation is, 
most of all, a part of availability [10]. It is used for preventing unplanned disruptions, 
and to guarantee availability. Information security is a vast field, and it cannot always 
be defined to cover all parts [11, pp. 27-28]. Described in Figure 2.1 is one definition of 
information security in automation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the end, information security can be seen as risk management, where the safety 
level required for the desirable level of availability is defined. In other words, with 
safety management it can be explained why a certain safety level of security has been 
chosen. Physical solutions are the foundation of technical solutions; if there is no physi-
cal safety, technical safety solutions are easy to bypass. On the other hand, many com-
panies rely plainly on physical safety; if an attacker can penetrate the physical obstacle, 
it will have access to the company‘s network. Technical solutions are the defence 
against network attacks and against disruptions caused by users or operation systems. 
Procedures, that is the way people do things, are user interfaces (UIs) to information 
security. Knowledge is internal information security, and it is gained through education. 
It supports the use of tools. Procedures, as well as technical and physical solutions, are 
tools for safety management. [10.]  
Smart Grid is a complex system, combining many different sub systems. The two 
most important sub systems in regard to information security are the power and ICT 
systems. In the power system, the most important factors are availability and reliability, 
which depend mostly on information security and functional safety. In ICT systems, 
information security focuses on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA) of the system. These have been derived from the fact that ICT systems in general, 
treat data, meaning there are only three ways that a computer can fail [12, p. 149]: 
1. The computer does not deliver the data on which we are dependent 
2. The computer delivers data with an erroneous value 
3. The computer delivers data to someone who is not authorized to receive those 
data 
Figure 2.1. The building blocks of information security in automation [10]. 
Information security of automation 
Procedures 
Risk analysis and risk 
management 
Technical 
solutions 
Knowledge 
Physical  
solutions 
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Information security in the Smart Grid must take into account the combined re-
quirements of both, power and ICT systems. The objectives of information security for 
Smart Grid are ensuring the availability of the grid, and ensuring the integrity and the 
confidentiality of the information. [13, p. 4; 14, pp. 35-45.] The objectives are described 
below in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These objectives identify the special structure of the Smart Grid: availability stands 
for the needs of the automation system, integrity for the ICT system, and confidentiality 
for the customer oriented system.  
One important part of confidentiality is customer privacy. This subject is being stud-
ied under work package four in sub task 10 of the SGEM project. Thus, in this thesis, 
privacy is left in the background. 
2.3 Special information security features of Smart Grid 
The special features of automation, such as real time-operations, limited processing 
power, and the continuity of the process have to be taken into account, especially when 
identifying the security requirements. The security requirements define what safety 
measures and technical solutions are to be used in order to assure the continuity of the 
process. In regard to the automation environment, following characteristics must be 
considered [11, pp 15-16]: 
- The consequences of a disruption can be severe 
- The lifespan of an automation system is long 
- Automation systems usually use custom made programs 
- Different user groups   
- Multivendor facilities 
For example, since the lifespan of an automatic system is long, updating system 
components can be hard; OSs are so old that no security updates are available. In addi-
tion, combining different information systems may cause problems. [1, pp 19-20.]  
There are also differences between the so-called normal process automation system 
and a Smart Grid system. First of all, Smart Grid will be strongly distributed and widely 
spread geographically speaking. Additionally, there are several interaction points to 
other systems and parties involved. All parties have to have necessary information about 
 
Availability  
 
Integrity 
 
Confidentiality 
Figure 2.2. The objectives of information security in Smart Grid. 
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the process, and usually data transfer is done via some public network, such as the 
Internet. In order to gain a good level of information security in this environment, there 
needs to be a consensus about the responsibilities, and the special features of each 
automation system that must be taken into account. [11, pp. 127-140.] However, as the 
Smart Grid consists of so many parties and so many systems, gaining the necessary 
level of information security is somewhat challenging. 
2.4 Threats 
The threats in the digital world are those of the physical world; if physical banks are 
robbed, so the digital ones will be too. Theft, racketeering, vandalism, voyeurism, ex-
ploitation, extortion, con games, fraud, and anything can be similarly done in the digital 
world, only the methods are different. Whereas in the physical world they use lockpics, 
in the digital one they use manipulation of connection and databases. [15, pp 15-16.] 
Where there is enough money or something worth money, for instance information, 
there will be those who try to take advantage of it.  
The digital world, however, has features that make it even more attractive and suit-
able for criminals: automation, omnipresence of Internet, and technique propagation. An 
adversary could, for example, take money illegally from a person´s bank account at any 
place in the world and at any time by using an automated script. Because of these fea-
tures, it will be harder to track, capture, and convict the perpetrators. It may, for in-
stance, be impossible for the prosecution authorities in one country to arrest a criminal 
in another country. Thus, the attacks will be much more common and larger scale than 
in the physical world. Even now, it is probable that the number of Internet crimes is 
bigger than physical ones. [15, pp. 17-22; 16.]   
Smart Grid is a complex system of systems, and thus the threats depend on what 
kind of environment the company is working in. However, on many occasions, the sys-
tem is based on the usage of public networks, such as the Internet, and on the usage of 
web technologies (see chapter 6.1). Thus, web based threats are, in many cases, rele-
vant. [17.] The most common threats are injection flaws, cross-site scripting (XSS), 
weak authentication and session management, insecure object references, cross-site re-
quest forgery (CSRF), and poor security configuration. XSS is a situation where an at-
tacker is able to inject client-side script into web pages, whereas in CSRF an end user is 
forced to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which she or he is authenti-
cated. [18]. 
2.4.1 Attacks 
The most common types of network attacks are eavesdropping, data modification, iden-
tity spoofing, password-based attacks, DoS attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, 
compromised-key attacks, sniffer attacks, and application layer attacks [19]. Probably 
the most dangerous of all attacks is a MITM attack, in which the adversary takes over 
the control of the network traffic. This way, the adversary can attack the field devices 
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unnoticed, by sending normal operational data to operator. [20.] In DoS attack, the idea 
is to send so much data to the target that it shuts down and makes the service – provided 
by the target – unavailable. There are many variations of this, but the basic idea is the 
same. In a case of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, the sources of the attack 
come from many different places. [11, p. 23-24; 15, pp. 181-186.]    
One way to categorize these attacks is to divide them into three classes: criminal, 
publicity, and legal attacks. Criminal attacks are probably the most obvious, and easy to 
understand, whereas publicity and legal attacks can be much more damaging. [15, p. 
23.]    
Criminal attacks aim at making a profit. The types of attackers can vary a great deal 
from lonesome riders to organized crime groups; from insiders to governments. The 
types of attacks can be, for example, fraud, scam, destructive attacks, intellectual prop-
erty theft, identity theft, and band theft. Privacy concerns form another issue. Different 
countries have different laws on them, some more strict than others. Privacy violations 
can be used for criminal purposes, but also legal ones. The difference between legal and 
illegal is a matter of technique used in the process. There are two types of privacy viola-
tions – data harvesting and targeted attacks. [15, pp. 23-41.]  
The attacks that are done in order to get publicity are called publicity attacks. These 
kinds of attacks are harder to figure out and are still relatively new in the digital world. 
Typically, the attackers are skilled hackers and choose their target system based on the 
probability that the press will cover it. [15, pp. 23-41.] One very widely used attack for 
publicity purposes is the DoS attack.  
The legal attacks are fundamentally different from the others in that their idea is not 
to exploit a flaw, or even trying to find it. The idea is to put doubt in the minds of the 
judge and jury of the fact that the security is not perfect, and to use this observation to 
prove the client‘s innocence. [15, pp 23-41.]    
2.4.2 Adversaries 
Behind every attack, directly or indirectly, is a human being or a group of people. They 
are fundamentally the same as in the physical world. However, locating the origin of the 
attack can be harder and in most cases even impossible in the digital world. Finding 
associates is also much easier in the digital world as one can stay home and keep one´s 
anonymity. Different adversaries have different objectives, motives, resources, levels of 
access and so on. The motives behind the attacks vary, most typical ones being vandal-
ism, curiosity, social pressure, challenge, thoughtlessness, and easiness. [15, pp. 42-43.] 
Recently, there has also been a change in the types of attackers; whereas the attackers 
used to be relatively random and amateur, they are now organized and professional. [11, 
p. 59.]  
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Table 2.1. The list of adversaries that NIST – SGWC introduces [13, p. 20]. 
 
A list of the adversaries in Smart Grid environment that the National Institution of 
Standards and Technology – Smart Grid Working Croup introduces (NIST - SGWC) is 
described above in Table 2.1. The list is not complete but gives a good base to start 
from. In addition to this list, one might add, for example the press, the police, and na-
tional intelligence organisations. 
Cyber warfare is currently a major and important part of military strategy for many 
countries [21]. Slowing and disrupting enemy forces without shooting a single shot is a 
great advantage. Moreover, gaining information on other countries‘ strategies and other 
sensitive information, can give a cutting edge, and create financial benefits. One exam-
ple of an attack that might have been conducted by a nation-state is the Stuxnet worm 
that was discovered in July 2010. It was designed to target only specific supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, possibly aiming to sabotage Iran´s nu-
clear program [22].  
The press can be seen as some kinds of industrial spies, but with different motives 
and values; the public‘s right to know is the mantra used to justify many acts and publi-
cations [15, p. 50]. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK) a huge scandal was cre-
ated when journalists were discovered phone-hacking people´s voice mails [23].  
Depending on a country‘s state of welfare and level of corruption, the police forces 
may be considered as an adversary too. They do have the law on their side, but they are 
not below it. National intelligence organisations, like the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), have more privileges than police forces, and for them, privacy violations, among 
other things, are everyday life. [15, pp. 43-58.]    
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According to Hyppönen [7], all attackers can be ultimately divided into three 
groups: online criminals, activist groups, and governments. The most obvious of these 
are the online criminals who aim to make profit by, for example, using a key logger to 
steal credit card numbers and so forth. The biggest of these online criminals are the mul-
timillionaires whose locations are unknown. The activists, or ―hactivists‖, attack be-
cause of an opinion, protest, or ideology, for instance. At the time of writing this thesis, 
probably the most famous activist group is Anonymous, who have conducted many suc-
cessful attacks against different entities, such as Sony [24]. The third attack group is the 
most secretive, and also the most dangerous – the government. The motives behind their 
attacks vary from money to solving crimes. For example, according to Hyppönen, the 
attack against Dutch company DigiNotar that was a certificate authority (CA), could 
have been done by some government. What is more, it is plausible that people were 
killed in this attack.  
2.4.3 Vulnerabilities   
The main vulnerabilities that the attackers use are, among other things, backdoors, vul-
nerable devices, vulnerabilities in protocols and field devices, unpatched software and 
firmware, and improper security procedures. Unsecure wireless connections, databases, 
interconnectivity, and especially the users themselves [15, pp. 255-271; 25], can be, and 
should be treated as serious threats to an organization‘s information security. 
Any modern automation system of today uses databases that are connected to a 
company‘s network. Structured Query Language (SQL) databases have gained a great 
deal of popularity but also have vulnerabilities that the adversaries try to utilize. For 
example, with an SQL injection or an XSS attack, it is possible to bypass the login, ac-
cess sensitive data, modify content, or shut down the server, thus causing a lot of dam-
age [20]. 
The lifespan of automation systems tends to be long, whereas the rotating cycles of, 
for example, operation systems are very short. Moreover, as the rotating cycle is short, 
and the programs are complex, daily updates are required to patch the security holes. 
This leads easily to a situation where the automation system software is not updated 
frequently, as the patches can break the sensitive system. [11, p. 90] 
For most people viruses, Trojan horses, and worms are familiar at least on some 
level. These software, also known as malware, are categorized as malicious software. 
Malware most usually consists of a payload and a propagation mechanism, where the 
payload is the part that does the damage. This damage can be anything from displaying 
an annoying message to screen to modifying the access control permissions. The propa-
gation mechanism is the part that spreads these malware; viruses live in other software 
and infect them, whereas worms live on their own, copying themselves to other com-
puters. Trojan horse, on the other hand, is a piece of software that installs itself in one‘s 
machine to some software and hides there. [11, pp. 19-21; 15, pp. 151-152.]    
The software of today are getting more and more complex, and thus making a 100 % 
secure software is virtually impossible. Security updates trying to patch the security 
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holes of faulty codes are more than common. In fact, most security problems are the 
result of faulty code. Attackers have used and will continue using these security flaws 
ruthlessly: buffer overflow means a flaw in the program that makes the program write 
data to an adjacent memory, out of the buffer‘s boundary. If this happens, the attacker 
might be able to access and modify the internal memory of the computer. These kinds of 
vulnerabilities are the most common ones and easiest to exploit. [11, p. 21; 15, pp 202-
211.]    
E-mail is part of everyday life for most people living in the occidental world. How-
ever, e-mail has no built-in security, but includes many security issues instead. 
Spamming has become the plague of today, covering more than half of all e-mail traffic. 
E-mails are also most often used as a propagation channel for malware and snooping of 
all kind of passwords. [11, p. 22; 15, p. 200.]    
Unfortunately, there are also security gaps in network protocols that are the corner-
stones of any communication. Attacks utilizing these gaps are called pharming, and they 
pose real threats. For example, under the domain name system (DNS) protocol, the local 
name server does not check where the answer for its queries comes from and ignores 
any additional replies. This enables hackers to replace the correct address with a false 
one, and act, for example, as a fake bank‘s sign-in page. [15, pp. 177-179; 26.] 
2.5 Security measures 
The key of any defence is defence-in-depth. It consists of various components, and how 
these components fit together. Ultimately, the overall safety is the product of these 
components. The components of the information security strategy are protection, detec-
tion, and reaction. These components work in tandem, meaning that if the system has 
strong protection, it does not need good detection and reaction mechanisms. On the 
other hand, without detection it does not matter how long the protection holds if the 
attack will never be noticed. Continuing the same philosophy, without reaction the de-
tection is worthless. Making things more complicated, sometimes detection and reaction 
mechanisms are impossible to make. In these cases the protection mechanism just has to 
be strong enough.  [15, pp. 272-282.] 
There are many sources of attackers and many ways to attack, but there are also 
ways to defend. These countermeasures have evolved too, including improvements in 
network best practices, more focused policies, regulations and directives, technical solu-
tions and so forth. These countermeasures and defend components, some of which are 
sturdier than others, are based on the following security methods and technologies. 
2.5.1 Cryptography, identification and authentication 
The heart of any security system is in cryptology, authentication, and identification. In 
order to understand just how the security is built on the Internet, one must understand 
cryptography, certificates, identification, and authentication. Protocols and methods like 
IPSec, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), Se-
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cure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME), and many others are built from 
different types of encryption and digital signature algorithms [15, pp. 85-86]. 
Cryptography is not new, but an old way to protect messages from being read by 
unauthorized people. One of the most known cryptography strategies was used in the 
World War II, where USA used Navajo Indian language to encrypt the messages [27]. 
The idea of cryptography is to modify the original message so that outsiders cannot 
make out the real content. There are basically two types of algorithm methods used in 
cryptography: diffusion and confusion. In diffusion, the letters in the original message 
are shifted according to some algorithm, whereas in confusion method, the letters are 
replaced with symbols. The most sophisticated, state of art cryptography methods are 
using both confusion and diffusion methods. [28.] 
The principle of cryptography is in the keys that encrypt and decrypt the messages. 
If both encryption and decryption are done with the same key, it is called symmetric-
key cryptography. The problem with this is the key management as each distinct pair 
must share a different key, raising the number of required keys to very high numbers. 
There is also the problem of securely establishing the connection between parties. The 
most common symmetric algorithms are Data Encryption Standard (DES) and triple-
DES, Rivest Cipher 4 (RC) and RC5, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), 
Blowfish, and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). [15, pp. 86-90; 29] 
In public-key cryptography, there are two different keys; a public key and a private 
key. As it is not possible to compute one key from another, one can publish the public 
key. A sender can now use this specific key to send encrypted messages to the one that 
published the key. Now only the receiver who has the private key can read the en-
crypted message. However, the problem of the public-key cryptography is the perform-
ance, and it is more common to use so called hybrid cryptography. [15, p. 95; 29] 
The idea of the hybrid cryptography is that the sender encrypts the message with 
some random symmetric key. Then the sender encrypts this key with the receiver‘s pub-
lic key, sending both the encrypted message and the encrypted key to the receiver. Now 
the receiver can first decrypt the random key with the private key, and then decrypt the 
real message. This is how encryption works in most of the protocols, such as PGP, 
S/MIME, TCP/IP, and many others. However, one problem remains, and that is the 
management of the keys. [15, p. 96; 29] 
Cryptography only takes care of encrypting the message. The integrity and authenti-
cation of the message can be assured with digital signatures. This means that the mes-
sage was created by a known sender and is not altered in the transit. This is done by 
using public and private keys just like in public-key cryptography. Now however, the 
sender encrypts the message with her private key, and the receiver decrypts the message 
with the sender‘s public key. As the private key is known only by the sender, it becomes 
the signature of the sender. [15, pp. 96-98; 29] 
However, the problem here is that the receiver can only be sure that the message is 
encrypted with the sender‘s private key but not about who really used that key. Certifi-
cates try to solve this problem by binding an identity and a public key. The identity can 
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be many things, such as the name of a person or organization, serial code of the com-
puter, and so forth. The certificates are issued to users by a CA, which can be, for ex-
ample, a private company. The CAs have different levels of hierarchy. The whole sys-
tem is called a public-key infrastructure (PKI). Certificates are used for network access 
authentication and are more secure than password-based authentication methods. [15, 
pp. 96-97; 15, pp. 229-234.] 
2.5.2 Technical solutions and methods 
In addition to using technical solutions like firewalls, companies also have to adopt se-
cure policies and methods to fight against adversaries [11, pp. 72-76;]. These can in-
clude, for instance, the procedures of hardening the OSs or backup policy. The follow-
ing paragraphs concentrate on introducing the most important technical solutions. 
Firewalls and virus protection are probably the most well-known software amongst 
normal people to protect oneself against malware. These solutions with some alterations 
are also used in companies. Firewalls can be software or a machine that protects internal 
network by controlling network transmission based upon a set of rules. With host based 
firewalls, programs can also be controlled. Firewalls are the boundaries between public 
and private networks and a starting point for information security. However, they cannot 
provide good level of security by themselves. [11, pp. 80-81; 15, pp. 188-193.]  
 Demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a logical or physical sub-network that connects a 
company‘s public services to a larger, untrustworthy network, such as the Internet [11, 
pp. 79-80]. This way an external attacker, for instance, would only have access to 
equipment in the DMZ. It is a crucial component of an organization´s overall safety.  
VPN is a secure connection over a public network to connect networks or mobile 
users to other networks. It uses different cryptographic protocols, most common being 
IPSec. [11, pp. 85-86; 15, pp. 193-194] 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system that monitors the network, looking for 
suspicious behaviour, and alerting of an attack. For example, Snort, developed by 
Sourcefire, is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system 
(IDS/IPS) that logs the network traffic, analyzes the core of the packets, compares pro-
tocols, and monitors the use and scanning of ports [30]. The problems with IDSs how-
ever, are false alarms, which eat away the reliability and trust of the system. [11, pp. 80-
81; 15, pp. 194-197.] 
Burglar alarms and honey pots are kinds of IDSs; they give an alarm when an at-
tacker goes to a certain place. Whereas with burglar alarm the sweet spots are specific 
things, in honey pot they can be entire computers or subnets masked to look inviting to 
attackers. [15, pp. 197-198.] 
A vulnerability scanner goes through computer files trying to find their known vul-
nerabilities. For example, Nessus, developed by Tenable Network Security, is a very 
popular vulnerability scanning program that can detect vulnerabilities like misconfigu-
ration, default passwords, denials of services, and so forth [31]. However, vulnerability 
scanners can neither find every vulnerability, nor measure the effect of their actions 
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when scanning. Web applications, especially, are problematic to scan, since they might 
have vulnerabilities not only in the platform and running environment, but also in code 
itself. Code is hard to test from outside and for this reason there are different tools to 
test them. Regardless of this, vulnerability scanners have their place in security meas-
ures. [15, pp. 198-200.]  
2.6 Security testing techniques 
There are several different methods to analyze the information security of the system. 
All these methods have their own characteristics and are best used in certain places. 
Automation environment often requires special attention, and it should always be con-
sidered thoroughly before using a certain method. The following techniques are the 
most used ones and will also be used in the testing part later on in this thesis.  
Network scanning is used for identifying active hosts, open ports, Internet protocol 
(IP) addresses, services, and detecting devices of the network. There are two types of 
methods for acquisition of information: passive and active. In the passive one, the net-
work is only being listened to, whereas in the active one, a large number of packets are 
sent. The conclusions are made based on the analysis of the data listened to. The passive 
method requires more time but is, on the other hand, virtually impossible to detect even 
with an IDS. [1, pp. 109-110; 14, pp. 114-116.]  
Vulnerability scanning is used to find well-known vulnerabilities of the system, such 
as unsafe old program versions. This method is important especially in an industrial 
environment, where programs are old and not updated frequently. On the other hand, 
vulnerability scanning will only find risks, and sometimes these found vulnerabilities 
cannot be fixed with any reasonable amount of money. [1, pp. 111; 14, p. 117.] 
Fuzz testing is often an automated or semi-automated testing method used to find 
security problems in software, especially in network protocols. It is a black-box testing 
model, meaning that there is no need to either know how the program works precisely 
or need for source code. In fuzz testing, invalid data is entered to inputs in order to find 
vulnerabilities that make the program behave in an unexpected manner. Fuzz testing 
may not always detect all possible vulnerabilities, and sometimes profound data-flow 
analysis is the only way to find specific vulnerabilities. With fuzz testing, it is possible 
to find mainly the simplest flaws in the program. However, those found vulnerabilities 
can be severe ones, and ones that most hackers would use. Fuzz testing gives a rash 
evaluation of the reliability of the program and implies what parts should be monitored 
closer. [1, pp. 108-109.] 
In penetration testing the information security level of the system is analyzed by at-
tacking against the system. There are a few different methods for performing a penetra-
tion test. In black-box testing, there is no need for earlier knowledge of the system, and 
thus it simulates the situation where the attacker does not know the system. In white-
box testing, the attacker has full knowledge of the system, simulating the situation 
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where attack comes from inside or it is the case of an information leak. [1, pp. 112-113; 
14, pp. 107-109.] 
Source code analysis can sometimes be the only way to test the program. The idea is 
to find, either manually or automatically, coding flaws from the source code. This 
should really be a part of the coding process where it can be easily managed, and where 
found flaws can be easily repaired. [1, pp. 113-114.] 
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3 SMART GRID 
This chapter aims at clarifying the complexity of Smart Grid, and introduces the TUT 
demonstration environment. Understanding the idea and, most of all, the structure and 
building blocks of Smart Grid is important in order to comprehend the risks in informa-
tion security. 
To help analyze and figure out the Smart Grid environment, the conceptual model 
based on the guidelines of the NIST/SGWC is introduced. This model is used with the 
TUT demonstration environment to figure out the domains and the players involved.    
3.1 The landscape 
In the future, energy generation and distribution will be more decentralized and utilizes 
localized renewable resources [14, pp. 1-18]. Even now, some farms or little remote 
islands are utilizing other kinds of energy sources, such as methane or hydrogen, to gen-
erate energy in an independent distribution system [32]. It has also become more and 
more popular amongst people to have a solar cell on the roof in order to reduce energy 
consumption by using solar power for, for instance, heating hot water. To bring up an 
example, in 2010, about six billion watts of solar panels were installed in Germany [33]. 
In near future, the excess electricity that the solar cell, for one, produces, can be sold to 
the grid company by using intelligent devices that communicate with grid companies 
over a network; in other words, via Smart Grid.  
Smart Grid is the name for a new electric grid that will supersede the old grid in the 
future. This new grid modernizes the electricity delivering system by introducing more 
intelligent devices, and information networks. Thus, it monitors, protects, and automati-
cally optimizes the operations of the grid. Smart Grid will be international by default, 
and it thus, also creates international energy trading markets. This will surely have an 
impact on the price of electricity. According to the study made under work package 
seven in sub task two of the SGEM project, almost in every scenario used the price of 
energy will first rise, but after year 2030 it starts to decrease [34]. Altogether, Smart 
Grid will update the old electric grid, providing new functionalities, and improving the 
quality, availability, efficiency, capability of self-healing and dynamic of the grid. [35, 
pp. 6-7.]  
The current deployment status of the Smart Grid is that it is in development. The 
process will take time, as the update is rather profound and vast. The transition will be 
gradual, taking one step at time. However, first steps are being taken all over the world 
towards Smart Grid [14, pp. 14-15]. Installation of smart meters to households has be-
gun all over Europe with timeframes varying from the end of 2011 to 2015 [36]. South 
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Korea has announced that their goal is to have a fully integrated Smart Grid by 2030, 
which, if completed, would be the first one [37]. 
3.2 Infrastructure and architecture 
Smart Grid will be a complex, integrated system consisting of sub systems. One way to 
divide Smart Grid is to think of it as consisting of layers. In the bottom, heart of the 
Smart Grid, is the power system layer, which takes care of the generation and distribu-
tion of energy. Above power layer is control layer that consists of sensors, SCADA sys-
tems and such, to help control the power system. These two layers are also in the current 
electric grid. However, Smart Grid also utilizes an ICT system, which consists of com-
munication, IT, and application layers. Somewhere between communication and IT lay-
ers there is also the information security layer. [38.] In the scope of this thesis, the ICT 
side of Smart Grid is more relevant, and thus the concentration is there as well. The 
high-level overview with the power and ICT systems of the Smart Grid is presented 
below in Figure 3.1. This figure is also presented in appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. High level picture of communication and power layers [38]. 
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The power system consists of power plants, transmission lines, substations, and end 
users. Power generation facilities are, for example, wind turbines, nuclear power plants, 
water turbines, etc. Electricity is transmitted via transmission lines from one point to 
another. Before the end user can use the electricity, the voltage level is lowered in 
transmission substations and distribution substations. The end user can be industrial, 
commercial or residential. The produced voltage level depends on the type of end user. 
The power system also includes networks, such as the power control network, that are 
used to operate and monitor the electric grid. [35.]  
The cornerstones of the information system are the communication networks above 
which security and application layers are provided. The communication networks con-
sist of sub networks, zones, providing means for devices to communicate. The zone in a 
customer‘s premises is called Home Area Network (HAN), or sometimes also referred 
to as Premise Area Network (PAN), or Building Area Network (BAN). This zone in-
cludes devices communicating over one or more networks. Field Area Network (FAN) 
is a zone that includes devices communicating between the individual service connec-
tions and backhaul points leading to the utility. It also includes distribution automation 
and control devices. The backhaul is a portion of the network that comprises of the in-
termediate links between the core network, and the small sub networks. Advanced Me-
tering Infrastructure (AMI) supports this zone. Substation Area Network (SAN) zone 
includes devices, such as capacitor banks and relays, communicating inside a single 
electric substation. The zone bridging the FAN and SAN, the utility Local Area Net-
works (LAN), and the back office is called Wide Area Networks (WAN). It also in-
cludes communications from control centres to the substations. [39, pp. 9-10.]  
The profound innovation of Smart Grid is the new decentralized architecture. As 
shown in Figure 3.2, current electric grid uses centralized architecture, where electricity 
flows one way only from bulk generators to end users. Decentralized architecture, how-
ever, enables energy generation in a more flexible manner, as there is no straight, tree-
like architecture; there are multiple routes to nodes so that smaller areas can be isolated 
in case of disturbances. Also, decentralized architecture enables local distribution and 
consumption of energy, thus enhancing the efficiency of the grid. This will be possible 
due to the two-way flow of electricity and information, and the distribution of intelli-
gence on the lower levels. Altogether, the architecture of Smart Grid will bring flexibil-
ity, and in some way carries great resemblance to the architecture of the Internet. [40.] 
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Figure 3.2. The architecture of the old electric grid and the new Smart Grid [40]. 
 
Smart Grid is really a network of networks. It brings together different networks by 
utilizing public networks, such as the Internet. The nationwide network, for instance, 
consists of smaller networks, which are interacting with each other. These smaller net-
works can be, for example, municipality networks consisting of even more sub net-
works. The high level view of the information network for the Smart Grid is shown in 
Figure 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. The information network of the Smart Grid [35, pp. 16-18]. 
 
Same principle goes for international networks. This way, Smart Grid enables inter-
action between national grids, and offers an efficient way to import and export electric-
ity on many levels.  
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3.3 Benefits 
There are great many benefits in Smart Grid, some being technical, some economical, 
and some even environmental. There is also a countless number of other benefits, some 
being hard to discover beforehand, such as changes in attitudes towards energy con-
sumption. 
 From an environmental point of view, the most important benefit is that Smart Grid 
encourages the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar cells. Current status in 
most of the well-fare countries is that customer cannot sell electricity that is self gener-
ated by using, for example, solar cells to the grid. With Smart Grid it will be possible to 
sell, and profit economically from these kinds of energy sources. This enhances the use 
of renewable energy resources, and is thus an important way to reduce emissions and 
global warming [35, pp. 6-9; 40]. Moreover, there might be a change in people‘s atti-
tudes towards the consumption of energy, as it becomes a part of their everyday life, 
and forms into a more concrete way to really affect their economics.  
 From an economical point of view, the most important benefit of Smart Grid is the 
enhanced efficiency [35, pp. 6-7]. There have been many calculations and estimations 
of how much Smart Grid will, in the end, save money. In Europe, according to a study 
made in last fall, Smart Grid could save as much as 52 billion Euros per year [41]. Also, 
it is not said how many new jobs will be created, and how many new companies 
founded. On the other hand, building a Smart Grid is not free; it requires a lot of re-
sources and money. Nevertheless, in the long run, it will be more than profitable.   
The technical point of view, which enables the other points of view, includes many 
important benefits. Maybe the most important one is the improved efficiency of the 
grid: household equipment, such as fridges and electric vehicles, can be used as a means 
to minimize excess power generation. Moreover, current electric grids around the world 
are several decades old, and thus not working as efficiently as they used to: transmission 
and distribution losses are ever growing numbers. Smart Grid also adds intelligence to 
the grid enabling local distribution and consumption of energy. The capability of self-
healing makes it more reliable, and more efficient. [35, pp. 6-9; 40.] 
3.4 Players  
The players of Smart Grid include a broad spectrum of different stakeholders having 
different roles and responsibilities. In many ways, Smart Grid resembles Internet. These 
players can be classified into five different sub-groups: grid operators, grid users, en-
ergy market place, providers of technologies, products and services, and influencers [42; 
43]. The figure describing the most significant players of Smart Grid is presented in 
appendix B.   
The electric grid can be split into two major subsections; the transmission and the 
distribution networks. The transmission networks are the backbone of the grids, and 
operated by transmission system operators (TSO) or independent systems operators 
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(ISOs). TSO is a non-commercial organization – usually at least partly owned by the 
state or government – responsible for an area to be electrically stable, and for the secu-
rity of supply in this area. The TSOs of the Nordic countries, for example, are Statnett 
SF (Norway), Svenska Krafnät (Sweden), Fingrid (Finland) and Energinet.dk (Den-
mark).[44; 45]  
The distribution systems are operated by distribution system operators (DSO), and 
their purpose is to distribute power from the transmission network to customers. DSO is 
quite like TSO, and responsible for regional grid access and grid stability, integration of 
renewable energy sources at the distribution level, and regional load balancing. For ex-
ample, the three biggest DSOs in the Nordic countries are Fortum, Vattenfall and E.ON. 
[44; 45] 
Both TSO and DSO have neutral monopolies to avoid unnecessary duplication of in-
frastructure, and to guarantee access to all players at equal conditions. A neutral mo-
nopoly means a situation, where the most economically efficient state is gained by only 
one supplier. Distributor might also act as a supplier, but is obligated to distribute power 
from any other supplier under the same terms. 
Grid users can be divided into electricity producers, suppliers, and consumers. En-
ergy producing companies have traditionally been operating mostly large power plants 
connected to the transmission network. Now, however, also small producers, such as 
small wind farms, connected at sub-transmission and distribution levels with very dif-
ferent characteristics are supplemented. [42.] The three major players in Nordic produc-
tion markets are Fortum in Finland, Vattenfall in Sweden and Statkraft in Norway [45].  
 Consumers will become more engaged in Demand Side Response (DSR), which 
means that consumers will response more fiercely to high prices of electricity. Consum-
ers can make more informed decisions on saving energy either by changing their behav-
iour, or by engaging with an energy efficiency service provider. [42.]  
Suppliers buy power either directly from a producer or through the energy ex-
change, and resell it to companies and households. To make DSR possible, suppliers 
will have to use dynamic load profiles, and complement this information with the actual 
information about market activities of consumers, producers and those who act on both 
sides, to the DSOs/TSOs. The supplier has a grid connection and access contract with 
the TSO or DSO, providing new services, real-time information, energy efficiency ser-
vices, and dynamic energy pricing concepts with Time-of-Use. In Nordic countries, for 
instance, the three following suppliers stand for a quarter of the supply: Fortum, Vatten-
fall and Dong Energy. [42; 45.] 
The energy production can be traded through bilateral contracts between suppliers, 
retailers, and end customers, or through a power exchange market place. Clearing and 
settlement agent acts as a contractual counterparty within a power exchange market, and 
for bilateral contracts. It assumes liability for covering the future settlement of these 
contracts. A trader is a player who owns the power during the trading process, buys or 
sells energy and services in power exchange market or bilaterally. A broker, on the 
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other hand, does not own the power but merely acts as an intermediary. To mention an 
example, Nord Pool Spot is the leading physical power market in Europe. [42; 45; 46.] 
A significant group of players in Smart Grid are the companies providing technolo-
gies, products, and services to the grid. This group consists of a vast variety of different 
companies providing different state-of-the-art technologies and solutions, for instance, 
metering operators and building energy management systems. [42.] One major player in 
this section is ABB.  
The influencers of Smart Grid can be divided into grid users, regulators, standardi-
zation bodies, and EU and national legislation authorities. Grid users and how they per-
ceive the value received from other actors have a great deal of influence on the eco-
nomic viability of the grid. Regulatory authorities ensure that companies under regula-
tory laws remain economically efficient, and both generation and retail companies adopt 
fair and transparent practices to the benefit of the customers. In Finland, for example, 
the regulatory authority evaluates the reasonableness of capital expenditure by means of 
a standard cost catalogue in which Smart Grid investments are treated like any other 
investment. Be the Smart Grid components more expensive than normal ones, then 
companies have to negotiate higher price. The regulatory authority then decides whether 
to promote these kinds of investments. [47, p. 19.] Standardization bodies are responsi-
ble for standardization of all components within the supply chain, whereas EU and na-
tional legislation authorities are in charge of defining legislation and policies such as 
environmental policy, and so forth. [42; 43.] 
3.5 The conceptual model  
NIST, a federal agency of the United States Department of Commerce, introduces a 
conceptual model of Smart Grid. The purpose of the conceptual model is to deepen the 
understanding of the building blocks of an end-to-end Smart Grid system, and demon-
strate how these blocks interact with each other. The conceptual model provides a high-
level framework for Smart Grid that defines seven domains: Bulk Generation, Trans-
mission, Distribution, Customer, Operations, Markets and Service Provider. Each do-
main consists of Smart Grid elements – applications and actors – that are connected to 
each other through two-way communications and energy paths – associations – through 
interfaces. The conceptual model shows all the communications and energy flows re-
lated to each domain, and how they are interrelated. [13, p 15; 35, pp 21-22; 48.] Figure 
3.4 presents the domains of the Smart Grid, and the electric and information flows.  
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Figure 3.4. The top-level view of conceptual model of Smart Grid [35, p 22].  
  
As can be seen, the electricity generation and distribution chain is provided in the 
bottom domains, those being bulk generation, transmission, distribution and customer 
domains. Information, on the other hand, flows in every domain.   
3.5.1 Domains and actors 
A Smart Grid domain is a high-level grouping of organizations, buildings, individuals, 
systems, devices, or other actors with similar objectives, and relying on — or participat-
ing in — similar types of applications. Domains have overlapping functionality, and are 
not organizations. For example, a distribution utility also has actors in Customer do-
main, such as meters. All seven domains are described below in more detail. [13, pp. 
14-15; 35, p. 22.] 
The Bulk Generation domain generates electricity in bulk quantities, and may also 
store energy for later distribution. The sources can be anything from renewable sources 
like solar and wind, to non-renewable sources like coal and gas. The Bulk Generation 
domain is electrically connected to the Transmission domain, and has interfaces with 
the Operations, Markets, and Transmission domains. [35, pp. 34-36; 48.] 
The Distribution domain distributes the electricity to and from Customers. It is the 
electrical interconnection between the Transmission domain, the Customer domain and 
the metering points for consumption, distributed storage, and distributed generation. It 
uses a two-way wireless or wired communication network to connect the smart meters 
and all field devices, managing and controlling them. Energy storage facilities, and al-
ternative distributed energy sources may also be connected to the Distribution domain. 
The Distribution domain communicates closely with the Operations domain in real-time 
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to manage the power flows associated with a more dynamic Markets domain. [35, pp. 
38-39; 48.] 
The Transmission domain transfers the bulk of electricity from generation sources to 
distribution through multiple substations. It is typically operated by a Regional Trans-
mission Operator or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO), who maintains stability 
of the grid by balancing supply and demand in transmission network.  The Transmission 
domain may also contain Distributed Energy Resources, such as electrical storage. To 
control and monitor the transmission network, typically a SCADA system is used. [35, 
pp. 37-38.] 
The Customer domain connects the end users of electricity and the electric distribu-
tion network through the smart meters, which provide information about customer‘s 
energy usage and patterns. Traditionally, there are three kinds of customer types, each 
with its own sub-domain and two-way communication networks: residential, commer-
cial/building, and industrial. The energy needs for each sub-domain are typically set at 
20 kW for residential, 20-200 kW for commercial/building, and over 200 kW for indus-
trial. The Customer domain is connected electrically to the Distribution domain, and 
communicates with the Operations, Markets, Service Provider and Distribution do-
mains. The boundaries of the Customer domains are typically the utility meter, and the 
Energy Service Interface (ESI). ESI is the primary service interface to the Customer 
domains, and it communicates with other domains via the AMI infrastructure, or via, for 
example, the Internet. The ESI communicates with devices and systems within the cus-
tomer premises using a LAN. The ESI provides a secure interface for Utility-to-
Consumer interactions, and can act as a bridge to facility-based systems such as the cus-
tomer‘s energy management system (EMS). The EMS is the entry point for such appli-
cations as, for instance, remote load control, monitoring, and control of distributed gen-
eration. [35, pp. 26-27; 48.] 
The Operations domain manages and controls the electricity flow of all other do-
mains. It uses a two-way communications network, and provides monitoring, reporting, 
controlling, supervision, and process information. EMSs are used in transmission opera-
tions to analyze and operate the transmission power system reliability and efficiency, 
while Distribution Management Systems (DMS) are used in distribution operations for 
similar purposes. [35, pp. 31-34; 48.] 
The Markets domain operates and coordinates all the participants in electricity mar-
kets by providing market management, wholesaling, retailing, and trading of energy 
services. It interacts with all other domains and handles energy information clearing-
house operations and information exchange with third-party service providers, for ex-
ample, roaming billing information for inter-utility plug-in-vehicles. The communica-
tion between the Market domain, and the domains supplying energy – Bulk Generation 
domain and Distributed Energy Resources (DER) – is critical, for the production and 
consumption is dependent on markets. DERs may be located in Transmission, Distribu-
tion, and Customer domains and are typically served though aggregators. The bounda-
 25 
ries of Market domain are at the edge of the Operations domain, the domains supplying 
assets, and the Customer domain. [35, pp. 28-29; 48.] 
The Service Provider domain includes all third-party services to support the busi-
ness processes of power system procedures, distribution, and customers, for instance, 
web portals that provide energy efficiency management services to end-customers, or 
outage management for the utilities. The Service Provider domain has interfaces with 
the Market, Operations and Customer domains. The communications with these do-
mains are critical for system control and situation awareness, and for enabling economic 
growth. [35, pp. 29-31; 48.] 
The following figure represents the domains of Smart Grid more precisely with the 
most important actors and interfaces. This figure is also presented in appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. The top-level view of conceptual model of Smart Grid [49, p. 35].  
 
Actors are devices, systems, programs or individual organizations that participate in 
the Smart Grid, such as smart meters. They exchange information with other associated 
actors through interfaces, and have the capability to make decisions. An organization 
may have actors in several domains. Applications are performed within a domain by one 
or more actors; for example, solar energy generation and energy storage, and energy 
management. Associations are logical connections between actors that establish bilateral 
relationships, and Interfaces represent the point of access between domains. [35, pp 22-
23] 
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3.5.2 Differences between North America and Europe 
North America is the pioneer of the Smart Grid, and is the reference model to Europe in 
the deployment of Smart Grid. By studying North America‘s process, Europe can avoid 
some pioneer mistakes made in the U.S. Since we are using the U.S as reference, it is 
also vital to understand the differences between these two environments. These differ-
ences can be grouped under three categories: technological, operational, and policy.   
 In North America, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is responsible 
for managing metering standards, whereas in Europe this is managed by the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and Measuring Instrument Directive (MID). 
This creates requirements for different products in the Europe and in the U.S. On both 
continents, the Smart Grid systems use a TCP/IP based communication, but with differ-
ent meter communication protocols. The European meters are using DLMS/COSEM 
suite of standards, whereas in the U.S, they are using NASI C12.18 and C12.22 com-
munications. This results in differences in head-end software, and low-level communi-
cation components. Additionally, in U.S, the Smart Grid is using mesh technology, 
whereas in Europe power line communication (PLC) and digital cellular communica-
tions are utilized. However, the recent developments in wireless mesh technologies in-
dicate that it will be taken into use in Europe too. Even though the radio emission stan-
dards differ, the architecture will be similar in the U.S and in the Europe. [50.] 
There is also difference in the operation management between the two continents. 
The meters used in Europe are roughly estimated half the price of the meters used in the 
U.S. In addition to this, the use of air conditioners is substantially larger in the U.S, 
which affects the peak demand. This makes the operational business benefits much lar-
ger in North America [50]. On the other hand, the cheaper meters used in Europe may 
not be so cheap after all, as they are not so reliable. For example, a Finnish DSO com-
pany had to change 22 000 meters because of a bad component [51]. It must also be 
taken into account that Europe has many cultures, which might make it more difficult to 
predict user behaviour causing peak demands, like baking the Christmas ham, or heating 
up Saunas at weekends.   
In Europe, each country has the individual authority of implementation of Smart 
Grid. However, they follow the guidelines of Smart Grids European Technology Plat-
form for Electricity Networks of the Future, a centralized mandate. In the U.S, there are 
no national, centralized mandates; thus, certain states are moving faster than others. 
Unlike the U.S, Europe has listed Smart Grid to their plan against global warming, 
which is catalyzing the process. Europe is ahead of North America in the use of renew-
able energy sources, and will profit more from the Smart Grid. [50; 52.] There are also 
differences in legislation and privacy policies. In the United States, people do not own 
their own data, and most privacy violations are legal, such as, for instance, data collect-
ing. In the EU, however, privacy policies are much more restrictive. [15, p. 29] 
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3.6 Smart Grid demonstration environment 
As a part of CLEEN‘s SGEM project, the department of electrical energy engineering of 
TUT made a laboratory demonstration environment for Smart Grid applications in the 
year 2011. It includes both the information and the automation systems, as well as the 
active resources. The ICT system of the laboratory environment consists of distribution 
network opetator control centre software, aggregator, home energy management system 
(HEMS), and interfaces between these. There is also a group of active resources 
available. Figure 3.6 below describes a general top-level view of demonstration envi-
ronment, and how the equipments are connected to other utilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
HEMS manages DERs – small-scale resources – by collecting measurements and 
making decisions, also providing an interface to these resources. Small-scale resources 
are resources that are typically owned by the end costumer, such as hot water boilers, 
electric vehicles and so forth. HEMS includes both ESI, and customer‘s ESM. In order 
to keep the processes and decision making fast enough, aggregation of information is 
required. An aggregator is a centralized information integrator quite like SCADA that 
collects, stores and aggregates information from, for example, HEMS. It provides rele-
vant information such as operational information, contract details, billing information 
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Figure 3.6. The Smart Grid demonstration environment. 
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and parameters of active resource controllers, and applications to higher level decision-
makers, such as Industrial Control System (ICS). [53, pp. 8-9.]  
3.6.1 Use cases 
Use case is a description of how actors work together to reach a goal [35, pp. 24]. There is 
a countless number of possible use cases related to this ICT and electricity distribution 
network automation system. The following paragraphs describe two possible use cases 
that utilize this environment.   
Monitoring of reserves 
As described above, a power system requires controllable loads to balance system fre-
quency and voltage in normal and disturbance situations. The large-scale resources have 
to be monitored in real-time, but in small-scale resources this would require enormous 
investments on the ICT system. However, real-time monitoring of reserves is not re-
quired, since the capacity of resources can be statistically forecasted. Many automatic 
reserves can also be operated based on local measurements, and real-time communica-
tion to TSO control centre is not needed. However, monitoring of these reserves is 
needed, for the system must not compromise the reliability of the power system.  [53, 
pp. 10-11.] 
In order to smoothen and improve the monitoring of reserves, hierarchical levels – 
increasing delays towards the small-scale resources – and classification of resources – 
normal/disturbance, response time and capacity – should be introduced. This way non-
real-time monitoring, short- and long-term statistical forecasts of resources, and the 
knowledge of what kind of reserves are available is gained. [53, p. 11.] 
Network overload management 
With Smart Grid, it is possible to supervise in real-time the overload of the network, and 
thus increase the network utilization rate. Centralized network overload management is 
based on the comparison of results to maximum loading values, and real-time measure-
ments, load flow calculations, or state estimation of managed network. [53, pp. 13.] 
Overload management is a control centre function implemented, for example, to the 
DMS, which gets real-time measurements via the ICT system. Based on the information 
that the DMS receives, it calculates the best possible estimate for network voltages and 
currents. The analysis of network overloading can be distributed to lower levels, and 
much closer to measurement point and control resources. [53, pp. 13.] The domains, 
actors and players 
3.6.2 The domains, actors and players 
The analysis introduced here is made based on the guidelines of NIST/SGWC. The 
starting point of the analysis is identifying related use cases, and dividing the demon-
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stration into domains and actors. After this it is easier to comprehend relevant interfaces 
and vulnerabilities.  
The domains of the use cases introduced earlier include Customer, Service Provider, 
Operations, Transmission and Distribution. Markets domain can also be very relevant in 
similar environment but with different use cases. In customer domain, the actors are 
ESI, EMS, and devices. The HEM system includes both ESI and EMS actors. In service 
provider domain, there is only one actor, the aggregator. The operations domain has 
SCADAs, DMS and EMS actors. The distribution and transmission domains do not 
have actors. 
The situation described here includes a range of different players that are, one way 
or another, involved in it. Starting from the equipment, there are the manufacturers of 
the HEM system, aggregator, SCADA, DMS, EMS and home devices. The users and 
owners of these equipment are most usually a different entity or person than the one that 
developed them. For example, the HEM system may belong to the customer or to the 
Internet Service Provider (ISP); the aggregator may belong to some Service Provider or 
to DSO; SCADA, EMS and DMS are operated by TSOs and DSOs; the home devices 
are used by the customer. Then there are the players who provide services, such as the 
TSOs and DSOs, ISPs, aggregators and so forth. These players also operate over the 
domains, for example, the DSO operates mainly in Distribution domain, but also in cus-
tomer domain with the smart meter that it owns. This is the general situation, the one 
that the laboratory demonstration is simulating. Figure 3.7 below presents which do-
mains and actors are involved, and how these are connected to each other.  
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In the figure, different colours represent different domains, for example, green is a 
colour of customer domain. The striped ellipse areas represent networks, whereas the 
rectangular areas represent actors. The domains are presented with rounded rectangles.  
The actual demonstration testing environment is simpler than the one it is simulat-
ing. For example, in the laboratory environment everything is run in TUT'´s Intranet, 
instead of using ISPs public networks [53]. Additionally, the roles of the electricity 
transmission and distribution, as well as most of the customer roles are left to the back-
ground in the demonstration. The players of the laboratory demonstration environment 
are: ABB in Operations domain, NSN in Service Provider domain, There in Customer 
domain, TUT in Service Provider, and customer in Customer domain. These equipment 
are managed in demonstration environment by TUT staff. Figure 3.8 below describes 
the overall situation of the laboratory demonstration environment with domains, actors, 
networks and players involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Smart Grid is a system of systems and has a variety of players, there is no mutual 
goal that would satisfy everyone. One example of this kind of situation is from the study 
made in Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The study indicates that real-
time information about the price of energy may result in a huge demand spike, if too 
many people follow the fluctuations, and turn on devices when the price of electricity 
crosses the threshold. This could, in the worst case, bring down the entire power grid. 
Fortunately, this can be prevented by simple types of price control. These price controls, 
however, reduce the efficiencies that the real-time pricing would bring. A more costly, 
but, in the end, a more efficient solution would be modelling the end users to respond to 
Figure 3.8. The domains, players, equipment, interfaces and players of the 
demonstration environment (See Figure 3.7, the colourcodes are equivalent). 
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different prices at different times. [54.] However, one thing that is common for all these 
stakeholders is that if the Smart Grid does not work, it will affect all. Thus, assuring that 
the Smart Grid will work in every condition is a common business advantage for all. 
One major part of securing Smart Grid is information security. In other words, informa-
tion security should be one of the most important things in every stakeholder‘s politics.  
Being a complex environment, these players cannot, in most cases, act alone, but in-
teract with other players. These interactions between players can be places of vulner-
ability, and require special attention. Usually, the information security of these inter-
connections is a matter of agreement between the companies involved, which, in the 
end, is a matter of trust.  
3.6.3 Laboratory demonstration equipment 
At the time this thesis was written, the home devices supported include thermometer 
and humidity sensor, motion detector, switches that include energy monitoring, and 
electricity meters either on Z-Wave or M-Bus. The first application made to this 
demonstration environment is frequency dependent load shedding. The idea of the 
demonstration environment is that it would be applicable for multiple Smart Grid 
applications. [53.] 
The equipment on the top level of the hierarchy in the demonstrations environment 
is the ICS, which is used to supervise, monitor, and control the system. The ICS of the 
demonstration consists of MicroSCADA Pro SYS 600 and MicroSCADA Pro DMS 
600, both developed by ABB. [53.] 
The heart of the aggregator, developed by Nokia Siemens Network (NSN), is an 
element management system called Open EMS Suite (OES), which is a software plat-
form for developing operation support system solutions. The aggregator also includes 
mediation components in order to communicate with lower-, and higher-layer network 
elements. Mediation is a software component that performs the necessary data conver-
sions and protocol-level integrations between systems. [53; 55.] 
The mediation between OES and ThereGate is called Agent. It runs on some com-
puter, other than OES, and is connected via the Internet to both OES and ThereGate. For 
each ThereGate, there is one Agent. The idea behind this structure is that, later on in 
real environment, hundreds of Agents could be accommodated in separate computers in 
the LV network. The mediation between OES and SCADA is called Northbound Me-
diator. It runs on some computer similar to Agent, and has Internet connections with 
both OES server and SCADA server. [53.] 
The HEMS of the demonstration environment is called ThereGate, developed by 
There Corporation. It is basically an advanced wireless router that runs on OpenWRT, 
open source Linux platform being a technology independent platform. Currently Z-
Wave and WLAN are the only supported wireless technologies, but other technologies, 
such as GSM/GPRS/3G and ZigBee, will also be integrated in the future. With addi-
tional USB adapter, M-Bus can be integrated. [53; 56.] 
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4 APPLIED THREAT MODELING 
This chapter presents the concept of threat modeling, and applies it to the TUT Smart 
Grid environment. The idea of this threat model is to provide a more general level pers-
pective of the environment, as in the later chapters a more detailed analysis will be pro-
vided.  
Threat modeling is a technique that helps to think about the security threats the sys-
tem might face. Nowadays, threat modeling starts from a planning process, where 
threats are identified, and suitable countermeasures taken into account. This way, the 
attitudes towards information secure coding are increased. Nevertheless, computer pro-
grams of today tend to be somewhat complex, which makes creating 100 % secure ap-
plications virtually impossible. The basic idea behind threat modeling is the idea that 
every system has something worth protecting. These are called assets. The system, 
however, has vulnerabilities that attackers are trying to use in order to access the assets. 
These create threats and vulnerabilities in the system. The security countermeasures try 
to mitigate these threats, and prevent damages. [14, pp. 153-154; 57.] 
4.1 The scope and limitations 
According to SGIP/CSWG, customers can be divided into three different types: residen-
tial, commercial, and industrial [49, p. 32]. These three users have a great deal of differ-
ences: the network structure, the type of adversaries, the type of attacks, the assets and 
so forth. Each case must be treated separately, identifying the special need of that envi-
ronment. For example, a commercial customer, such as a shopping mall, wants to offer 
wireless local area network (WLAN) Internet services to the customers, or services such 
as charging one´s electric vehicle in the future. Same services may be provided in the 
private costumer´s premises, but the environment is rather different, which creates dif-
ferent security issues. In addition to this, the consequences of a possible penetration can 
vary depending on the customer: for example, a successful attack in an industrial envi-
ronment has potential to cause devastating damage to the entire society, whereas in pri-
vate households the-worst-case-scenarios are not that grave.    
The threat model of this thesis is derived from SANS Threat Modeling principles, 
keeping in mind the Smart Grid environment [57]. The domains that this environment 
includes are Customer, Service Provider, Distributor, and Transmission domains. How-
ever, this threat model is made from the end users perspective, and focuses on the Cus-
tomer domain, especially HEMS. 
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4.2 Viewing the system as an adversary 
Stepping into the shoes of the adversary gives valuable information on how the attacks 
could happen, and which vulnerabilities they might be utilizing. Studying the system 
from the outside, from the point of view of the adversary, and identify all entry and exit 
points of the system is the first step. Thinking like the adversary also helps to figure 
what are the assets of the system. [57; 58.]  
4.2.1 Entry and exit points 
In order for the components to interact and exchange data, there must be interfaces, en-
try and exit points that these components use. SGIP/SMWG introduces a logical refer-
ence model of Smart Grid, which contains seven domains and actors with interfaces 
between them. This model was used to find the actors and interfaces of the system. The 
model is presented in appendix C. From the TUT environment, the following actors 
were found: 
- SCADA 
- Aggregator 
- Customer EMS 
- Meter 
- Distributed energy resources 
- Customer appliances and equipment 
- Electric vehicle 
- Premise display 
The actors, domains, and interfaces between these actors are presented in Figure 4.1. 
Distributed energy sources, premise display, customer appliances and equipment, and 
electric vehicle actors are in the same box since their logical interfaces are the same.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.1. The actors and interfaces of monitoring of reserves. 
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Table 4.1. The identifications, names and descriptions of the demonstration’s entry and 
exit points. 
Logical inter-
face category 
ID Name Description 
16th U1 AGG-HEMS Interface between aggregator and HEMS. HEMS 
provide information about local resources and such 
to aggregator. 
18th U2 HEMS-
METER 
Interface between HEMS and meter. Meter provides 
metering information about for example electricity.   
15th U3 HEMS-UI UI to HEMS for end user. HEMS provide UI where 
user can monitor and manage HEMS, devices and 
resources.  
  
There are more interfaces inside the system, for example, inside an aggregator or 
ICS, than the figure presents. However, as these interfaces are inside actors, they are not 
the first ones to be attack against.  Despite that, certain amount of attention must be ap-
plied to these interfaces too, for if the attacker is able to penetrate the ―first wall‖, there 
must be other ―walls‖ to protect the system too.  
 Three of these interfaces are relevant from the end users point of view. The in-
terfaces can be divided into logical interface categories according to the SGIP/SMWG 
division [13, pp 26-71]. These logical interfaces are presented in appendix C. The above 
Table 4.1 describes the logical interface categories, identifications, names, and descrip-
tions of the interfaces.  
Between HEMS and aggregator, a great deal of information about customers is 
transferred and handled. Some of this information is rather sensitive, and should be 
treated as confidential and private to prevent unauthorized access to it. Also, a great 
many interactions and appliances are taking place, meaning that if the data is invalid or 
wrong, it will have a large impact. However, most interactions are neither real-time 
based, nor have any connection with the power system operations.  
The location of HEMS will be at the customer´s premises. This means that the 
physical safety of ThereGate is left, at least partly, to the responsibility of the customer. 
Keeping in mind that ThereGate will be implemented to every household, it is certain 
that some of these people are criminals, and possible adversaries to Smart Grid. For 
example, it might become a luring idea to try manipulating one´s energy consumption 
information in order to gain financial profit from it. In order to maintain at least some 
level of physical safety of ThereGate, seals or other solutions need to be applied. How-
ever, it is only a matter of time when someone figures out a way to bypass the seal, and 
puts the information to the Internet for everybody to see. In the end, there is no way to 
prevent the crime for happening, but there are ways for knowing and proving that it has 
happened. HEMS can also be robbed or misused.  
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Table 4.2. Security requirements of the interfaces. 
Interface Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
U1 H M L 
U2 L H L 
U3 L M M 
 
One important limiting factor for the HEMS is the cost; it can cost only cost that 
much money meaning compromises in many parts, also in security components such as 
firewalls. The HEMS will be accessible by many different vendors with different con-
cepts of security. [13, pp. 57-58.] 
Between HEMS and meter, the integrity of data is vital, as wrong data would have a 
straight impact on the system. The availability of the information is important, but not 
critical, since alternative means for gaining the information can still be used. Many 
stakeholders may need access to the metering data, increasing the cross-organizational 
security concerns. Some of the meters are located in unsecured locations, limiting the 
physical security. Also, Smart meters and the standards that they use are still relatively 
new, having possible vulnerabilities in them. Meters are constrained in their 
computational capabilites, and the key management of millions of meters is a challenge. 
[13, p. 63.]  
The UI of HEMS will also handle some sensitive material that should be treated as 
confidential. However, there is no need for realtime information, and the availability of 
informatoin is not critical. The places of vulnerabilites and challenges are in wireless 
communications, and in key management [13, pp. 54-55.]. Table 4.2 above presents 
NIST´s security requirements for the three interfaces in question [13, p. 75].  
The conclusion is that, according to NIST, the integrity of information is a number 
one priority. This is rather sensible, as wrong or false information would lead, in the 
end, to the system to operate falsely. However, especially from the end user‘s point of 
view, the confidentiality of information is also an important factor. 
4.2.2 The assets 
Adversaries attack because of the assets that the system possesses. These assets can vary 
from money to reputation. From the end user‘s point of view, the system handles a great 
deal of information about customers, keeping track of their electricity consumption, 
sensitive personal information and so forth. If this information is accessed by an unau-
thorized person or utility, it may be possible, for example to know when the user is at 
home, what is the user´s energy consumption behaviour and so forth. This information 
can be used by criminals to plan a robbery, police forces like the CIA to monitor users, 
adversary companies like Google to profile users´ needs and so forth. [14, pp. 19-32.] 
 
 
 36 
Table 4.3. The assets of the system. 
ID Tangible Intangible Description 
A1 Information  Information about customers may be of interest by 
many adversaries.  
A2 Property/ 
people 
 Customers have a lot of different equipment to 
protect, like resources, home security equipment 
and such. Also, Smart Grid is for people and must 
not compromise human lives or their well-being. 
A3  Feel of security If the end users do not trust Smart Grid or feel safe 
at their home, this will ultimately destroy the im-
plementation of SG. 
 
Besides information, customers also have resources, devices and property that can 
be harmed, robbed, destroyed, or used without permission for various motives. An un-
authorized use of user´s home devices may result in melting of fridge, or in the worst 
case, cause fires or other accidents that can take lives. Also, as the users‘ resources are 
part of controlling the grid, they might be attacked in order to cause trouble to the whole 
grid. HEMS will also provide the most accessible path to the Smart Grid, and thus, it 
will be under attacks.  
Successful attacks can change the attitudes against Smart Grid, especially if people 
start to think that their security as well as dependability of their electricity is in danger. 
The feel of security can actually be one of the biggest assets that the end users have. The 
lost of trust and confidence on the system can result in many issues, for instance, avoid-
ing the use of the equipment leading to the unsuccessful implementation of Smart Grid. 
Table 4.3 gathers all assets of the end users and categorizes them into tangible and in-
tangible groups.  
The third asset, feel of security, is rather connected to the other assets. In other 
words, successful attacks targeted to assets A1 and A2 can lead also to asset A3, even 
though not intended.  
4.3 Characterizing the system 
To comprehend exactly how a possible attacker could penetrate the system by, for ex-
ample, manipulating the data, it is vital to understand the system more closely. Since all 
systems treat data, data flow figures are a very practical way of representing how the 
system works; where data comes from, where it goes to, who has access to it, and so on. 
[57; 58.] Figure 4.2 describes one possible way of how the information of end users is 
aggregated, and sent to the ICS. The figure does not take into account what happens to 
the data inside the ICS or aggregator. 
. 
  
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To make the data flow more complete the following lists describe what exactly the 
requests and responses could contain [53]: 
 
Request 1; Messages from aggregator to HEMS: 
- Parameter change 
- Query to check if the communication and automation system are alive 
- Distribution of contract and tariff data to resources 
- Query of missing or bad quality data 
 
Reply 1; Messages from HEMS to aggregator: 
- Disturbance event (real-time data) 
- Disturbance recording 
- Monitoring of resources (real-time data) 
- Statistics of resources 
- EV started charging (real-time data) 
- EV stopped charging (real-time data) 
- Registration of new resource 
- Customer query about its own resource 
 
Request 2; Messages from ICS to aggregator 
- Query to check if communication system is alive 
 
Reply 2; Messages from aggregator to ICS: 
- Disturbance report to SCADA 
- Summary of real-time information about resources to SCADA 
- Query to check if communication system is alive 
 
Figure 4.2. The data flow of the demonstration system from devices to ICS. 
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As mentioned, this architecture is one possible solution. The business idea behind 
this model is that aggregator has some control over customers´ devices like, electric car 
batteries, and can thus provide this controlling service to grid operator.  
4.3.1 Implementation of the system 
There are many ideas and plans of how the information infrastructure of Smart Grid can 
be carried out. Especially, the collection, aggregation, and distribution of information 
from customer domain are still open questions. One possible solution for information 
infrastructure is a decentralized plan, where the idea is to distribute the decision making 
devices to many levels. The decentralized plan enables local generation and consump-
tion of energy, as well as other functionality. 
In the decentralized model, the aggregator plays an important role. The aggregator 
itself can be divided into several software components that are running and working in 
different computers, and in different places of the grid. LV automation system is one 
very plausible place for the aggregator component, having connections with the HEMS, 
and with other main aggregator components. Especially in a rural environment, these 
centres might be easy targets for adversaries, and require some sort of surveillance. In 
order to communicate with each other, these components need a network.  
In Finland, many entities, such as electric distributor companies and teleoperators 
have been installing a great deal of optical fibre. In fact, Finnish communications regu-
latory authority, FICORA, set a goal that by the end of 2015, a national broadband net-
work will be installed [59]. As HEMS will be at the customer´s premises, wired solu-
tions, such as cable or optical fibre, provide a natural way for HEMS to be connected to 
other components of the Smart Grid system. However, there are also components, for 
instance, smart meters, in the Smart Grid that will use additional techniques for com-
munication. In Finland, for example, all smart meters use tunnelled general packet radio 
service (GPRS) which the ISPs are providing to the DSOs [60]. This threat model con-
centrates on the connections of the HEMS.  
Since the HEMS will utilize the Internet as communication media, it might also act 
as an enhanced WLAN router. In order for customers to easily manage and configure 
both WLAN settings and home devices, the HEMS will offer a UI [53]. There are vul-
nerabilities with WLAN, even when configured and used properly. The risk differs 
greatly depending on the location and type of use. For example, using WLAN in house-
holds in a rural area is a bit different than using it in apartments in cities. Despite this, 
the vulnerabilities and threats remain the same; only the likelihood differs. Same goes 
for other wireless networks that the HEMS provides, such as Z-Wave among others.  
In apartment buildings, the network structure is a bit different from private house-
holds. It is typical that the communication and data of all apartments are gathered, and 
sent via optical fibre that comes into the building. The communication technique to each 
apartment can vary. Home PNAs, for example, are used in many places utilizing the old 
installed twin cables [61]. The Smart Grid implementation in these kinds of environ-
ments can be done utilizing the already existing network structure or with, for example, 
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using GPRS. However, with the Smart Grid too, the information is first gathered from 
all the apartments, and then sent forward, even with GPRS technique. In any case, the 
information is sent using the same cable or optical fibre that the Internet uses. From an 
information security point of view, this may raise new threats, such as possibility of 
information leakage via eavesdropping. 
4.4 Determining threats and vulnerabilities 
Threat is a potential attack that, by exploiting vulnerability, may harm the assets. Vul-
nerability, on the other hand, is a flaw, or weakness in a system that could be exploited 
to violate the security policy of the system. The HEMS is the most alluring and proba-
bly also the easiest path for adversaries to penetrate into the Smart Grid system, and 
thus also will be subject to a variety of attacks. From the end user point of view, this 
creates the biggest threats, and the main attack vectors.  
The attack vectors presented here describe three situations in which the assets could 
be reached: the HEMS crashes, works incorrectly, or loses sensitive information. The 
root cause to these situations can be found by following the attack trees to the last node 
(path marked with red colour). These attack trees do not cover all possible threats, but 
concentrate on the most likely and severe ones. Same applies with the vulnerabilities 
behind the threats. Neither do these threat trees give very specific threats, but leave 
them on a higher level. Each of the root causes could be investigated further, but the 
idea of this threat model is to remain on a more general level. 
4.4.1 HEMS crashes 
The most straightforward and visible threat for the system is a situation where the 
HEMS stops working. The HEMS may fail due to unintended reasons, such as a light-
ning breaking the equipment, or intended reasons, such as DoS attacks. Unavailability 
of the HEMS can cause unexpected situations. For example, if the HEMS has been in-
structed to turn off the fridge for a while, and after that the HEMS will be out of service, 
the fridge continues to stay off. Figure 4.3 presents the attack tree of this threat.  
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From the reasons that can cause the HEMS to be unavailable, the DoS attacks are 
the most important ones to address. This is because they are not as obvious to people as 
an electricity blackout, or a physical break down. Also, defence against DoS attacks is 
much harder, sometimes even impossible. There is a variety of different types of DoS 
attacks. The attack tree represents only a few which are relevant in this environment.  
 The vulnerabilities behind DoS attacks vary depending on the situation. In SYN 
flood, for example, the attacker uses the TCP three-way handshake wrongly by only 
sending a synchronize (SYN) message to the server, but not responding to the server´s 
acknowledge (ACK) messages [62]. The most recent DoS vulnerability has been found 
in the secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol, where the attacker demands renegotiations of 
encryption keys, resulting up to 1000 parallel connections between client and server 
[63].  
4.4.2 HEMS works incorrectly 
Another threat situation is if the HEMS works improperly; for example, it turns on the 
Sauna even though not supposed to, or sends wrong information to higher level equip-
ment such as the aggregator. The causes for the HEMS to malfunction are unintended 
and intended code-based errors, and adversaries´ attacks. Figure 4.4 presents the attack 
tree of this threat.  
  
Figure 4.3. The attack tree of HEMS crashes.  
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The modification of information is a serious threat that must be addressed, as it can 
be harder to notice than a program failure. If, for example, the metering information is 
slightly changed, it can take a long time to spot it, and may result in financial losses for 
a customer or for an electric company. The modification of data includes bad messages, 
situations where, for example, the parser fails, and also intended unauthorized modifica-
tions. It must also be remembered that this attack tree applies to the situation where in-
formation comes from a higher-level to the HEMS, for example, from an aggregator 
Adversaries can manipulate data if they have access to equipment such as meter or 
HEMS, or if they perform a MITM attack. If no encryption or authentication is used, 
performing an MITM attack is easier. The vulnerabilities behind parser failure are most 
commonly due to data validation process. Attacks, for instance, SQL injection, exploit 
these issues, trying to gain access to sensitive information for instance.  
One of the biggest threats that the system poses is that the HEMS is accessed by an 
unauthorized person. There are several ways for this to happen; hacking the Web inter-
face via browser, using vulnerabilities of wireless technologies, using the end user‘s 
personal computer to access HEMS, or physically accessing the HEMS. The adversary 
might be able to not only control the home devices, but also manipulate metering infor-
mation that is sent to the aggregator. The adversary may also gain access to sensitive 
information. Following Figure 4.5 presents the attack tree of this threat. 
  
Figure 4.4. The attack tree of HEMS works incorrectly.  
Incorrect behaviour of HEMS 
Program failure Information modification 
Parser failure etc. Man-in-the-middle Unauthorized access 
to HEMS/devices 
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The bypass of authentication is possible due to the vulnerabilities in planning and 
coding processes. Most of them can be avoided by using safe coding principles. It is 
more difficult to protect the system against identity frauds. This is due to the fact that 
end users are the information security threat number one, and due to the restrictions that 
some of the equipment pose, like cost efficient solutions, and memory or central proc-
essing unit (CPU) constraints. Figure 4.6 below presents how an adversary might learn 
the credentials of the end user, device or equipment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regardless of the system, the human-factor is always its weakest point, and poses 
the biggest vulnerability. People are, in the end, lazy, ignorant, unaware, busy, and rash, 
and many other things that make exploiting them an easy target. In the long run, even 
the most conscientious people will break the security instructions and procedures of the 
company. In the HEMS, the biggest effect of the human-factor is in the UI. Usernames 
and passwords are very common ways of identification and authentication of the users. 
However, these kinds of systems do not work as well as people think they do. Firstly, 
Figure 4.5. The attack tree of unauthorized access - HEMS.  
Figure 4.6. The attack tree of unauthorized authentication – HEMS.   
Unauthorized access to devices/equipment 
Rob device/ 
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there is a contradiction between a good password and one that users remember, or even 
use. Dictionary attacks can be effective against a poor and even not so poor a password, 
as the computing power has increased significantly. Nowadays, passwords can be brute-
forced. For example, with 400 MHz Quad Pentium II, every possible seven character 
password can be tried in 480 hours using the L0phtcrack program. Also, there are users 
that make things even worse by choosing the same password from one application to 
another, or are willing to give the password away to others too eagerly. Other creden-
tials have vulnerabilities as well. For example, if certificates are used, the most difficult 
problem to solve is the safe management of the keys. Even users that are more aware of 
information security can be used to penetrate the system. For example, it is very much 
possible and rather easy to get some malware on one´s computer. These malwares can 
spoof the user´s credentials and so forth. [15, pp. 136-141.] 
There are solutions to make the use of a password more secure; this can be done, for 
instance, by locking up the system after a certain amount of bad passwords. However, 
this must be done in discrete manner, or it can lead to another type of DoS attack. 
4.4.3 HEMS losses sensitive information 
One of the assets that the end users have is information. The loss of sensitive informa-
tion is a serious threat that may result in several issues. An adversary needs only to be 
able to see the sensitive information. This can be done through MITM attacks, gaining 
access to device or equipment, bribing some person or utility that is handling the infor-
mation, or eavesdropping. Figure 4.7 below presents the attack tree of this threat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Presumably many utilities will be interested in information on customers. This may 
lead to the point that, for example, some news agency will bribe someone from the ag-
gregating company to give sensitive information. However, if the punishment of such a 
crime would be high enough, people would not be so eager to take the risk. MITM at-
tacks and eavesdropping are both dangerous attacks. Encryption of information will, 
however, prevent easy access to data.     
  
Figure 4.7. The attack tree of loss of sensitive information – HEMS. 
Loss of sensitive information 
Man-in-the-
middle 
Access to devices/ 
equipment 
Eavesdrop Bribery 
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5 REVIEW OF LABORATORY DEMONSTRA-
TION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the TUT demonstration equipment from a secu-
rity point of view. This is very important in order to comprehend which security issues 
apply, and how adversaries might exploit the system.  
The main focus of this thesis is from the interface of the ICS downwards, all the 
way to end user‘s devices. The ICS itself is left to less attention. This thesis will also 
neglect analysis of communication technologies, such as PLC, or long term evolution 
(LTE) used between devices, and the HEMS or other Smart Grid components. There-
Gate will aim to be independent from used wireless technologies. In the current status of 
demonstration, only the Z-Wave and WLAN are supported, but in the future, other 
techniques will be supported as well. Wireless communication methods, such as Z-
Wave or WLAN, are, in the end, just using different media than the wired ones. Al-
though wireless technologies have their own characteristics, the information security 
problems are mostly the same, as they do not alter according to the used media. For this 
reason, analysing wireless technologies is left to the background, and only Z-Wave and 
WLAN security issues are briefly analyzed.  
The analysis presented here will not discuss users, procedures or such, but instead 
focuses on the technical part. The information presented in this thesis regarding these 
components is based on current versions of the equipment and software.  
5.1 Components 
The laboratory demonstration environment consists of ICS (SCADA/DMS), OES, 
Agent, Northbound Mediator, and ThereGate [53]. ICS and OES are already commer-
cial, full-fledged software, whereas ThereGate, Agent, and Northbound Mediators are 
still under development. Figure 5.1 presents the overall layout of the demonstration with 
components and used platforms.   
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As illustrated, ThereGate and OES run on Linux, whereas both mediators – Agent 
and Northbound – run on the same computer with Microsoft Windows 7. ICS runs on 
Windows XP. From an information security point of view, the most critical part of the 
system is the part that is the most public, and has a variety of different users. In this case 
ThereGate is the customer interface, and securing ThereGate should, thus, be the num-
ber one priority.    
5.1.1 ThereGate 
Basically, ThereGate is an enhanced WLAN router with firewall and Network Address 
Translation (NAT), port forwarding, and media access control (MAC) address filtering. 
It runs on an embedded Linux OS, and communicates with home devices, using home 
automation communicating protocols. In the demonstration, however, no devices are 
connected. The hardware of ThereGate consists of a processor (533 MHz), 256 MB 
DDR2 memory, 6 GB of internal flash memory, and a trusted platform module (TPM) 
v. 1.2. It includes four USB 2.0 host ports, an SD memory card reader, and an Ethernet 
switch with four LAN ports, and one WAN port. ThereGate has an external power 
source, but can run on batteries as well. [53; 55.] 
ThereGate has connections to the Agent, and it provides a graphical UI (GUI) for 
the user to monitor, add, and control home devices, and configure the WLAN router 
settings. The connections to the Agent and the GUI are done by using hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) application programming interface (API). This connection uses HTTP 
with SSL/TLS to protect the information. ThereGate can also be accessed remotely with 
a terminal using a secure shell (SSH) connection. In order for a user or an application to 
access ThereGate, they need to have proper credentials (username/password combina-
tion). [53.] 
Figure 5.1. The layout of demonstration environment consisting of computers, com-
ponents and interfaces.  
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The connection to the Agent uses a request/reply message pattern. This means that 
the Agent must start the communication, and ThereGate cannot send anything sponta-
neously to the Agent. This is why there needs to be a time-based communication struc-
ture; the Agent requests raw, real-time data from ThereGate every minute, using GET 
request. The data is expressed in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), and contains in-
formation about the customer, devices, meters and so on. [53.] Figure 5.2 below pre-
sents the core components and protocols of ThereGate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The version of ThereGate presented in the above Figure is used in the demonstra-
tion. However, in later versions, ThereGate will most likely include other components 
and servers as well, for instance, a universal plug and play (UPnP) server. Adding com-
ponents like UPnP to ThereGate will radically change the situation by creating new in-
formation security threats. Thus, after every change made to ThereGate, a new evalua-
tion of information security must be made. 
5.1.2 Aggregator 
The aggregator can be divided into three software components: Agent, OES and 
Northbound Mediator. OES is the aggregation centre where all the information is gath-
ered. Agent and Northbound Mediator are just adapters to connect the ICS to OES, and 
OES to ThereGate. [53.]   
The Agent itself consists of three components: HTTP Client, an extensible mark-up 
language (XML) file generator, and an NE3S/WS interface. The HTTP Client is used to 
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communicate with HTTP Server of ThereGate. This communication uses HTTP to 
transmit the messages, and also provides also possibility to encrypt the data with 
SSL/TLS. The messages from ThereGate are in JSON file format. However, in OES, 
the configuration management (CM) and performance management (PM) adaptations 
define the structure details of files that can be accepted to OES; only certain type of 
XML files – Open Configuration Data Standard (OCoS), and Open Measurement Stan-
dard (OMeS) files – are accepted. In order to make such files, Agent first uses JSON-lib 
library to parse JSON files and extract useful values from them, and then creates OMeS 
and OCoS files. In this demonstration, the power demand value is treated as PM data, 
and used to create an OMeS file, information such as timestamp, status, indoor-
temperature, and so forth being treated as PM data, and used to create an OCoS file. If 
there is need to update the values, the XML files are attached to simple object access 
protocol (SOAP) requests, and sent to Mediation Framework (MF) of the OES, using an 
NE3S/WS interface. SOAP can be used in combination with a variety of Internet proto-
cols. In the case of the demonstration, SOAP uses HTTP for message negotiation and 
transmission, and XML for message formats. The SOAP messages are not encrypted, 
but are in a plaintext format. Before sending any information, authentication is required; 
first, MF discovers and registers the Agent during which the Agent is working as a Web 
Service (WS) Server. When the registration is over, the Agent begins sending SOAP 
requests to MF, and works as a WS Client. However, there is no specific authentication 
for Agent; the Agent ID is its IP address, and the Agent key is allocated by the OES. 
[53.] 
The OES has connections to both Northbound Mediator and the Agent. It also has a 
Desktop UI for the software developers and staff in the aggregation centre that can be 
used via Web Browser. These users can be authenticated, and their access controlled 
with OES user management. All the messages between OES and Desktop UI are trans-
mitted over HTTP, and encrypted by SSL/TLS. To the Agent side, the connection is 
done by using MF, which works in the manner of a middleman, allowing the fact that 
the Agent does not have to be concerned about the OES structure. From the MF, the 
XML files divided into measurements and control information are populated into the 
databases accordingly. The PM data is later handled by the OES PM Platform to make 
an aggregation calculation. The CM data is later handled by OES Managed Object 
Framework (MOF), which enables presenting needed information on the OES desktop 
UI. [53; 54.] 
The function of Northbound Mediator is to work as an adapter between the OES and 
ICS systems. Each minute, Northbound Mediator retrieves and aggregates raw data di-
rectly from the OES PM Database by using PM SQL API, which has read access only to 
the data. The Northbound Mediator is authenticated with a username/password combi-
nation when establishing connection to the database. However, no encryption is used at 
this point. In order to communicate with the ICS, Northbound Mediator acts as open-
ness, productivity and collaboration unified architecture (OPC UA) Client, and sends 
the sum of power demand values to the ICS over an OPC-UA TCP protocol. The OPC 
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UA client has been made using Open source OPC Client from Prosys OPC UA Java 
SDK. This connection is using neither authentication of client, nor encryption of data. 
[53.] Figure 5.3 below presents the components of the aggregator, and how they are 
connected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the OES is already developed software, more specific information about its ar-
chitecture and building blogs is difficult to require. However, even though not all in-
formation is available, a good deal of information analysis can be done, as the interfaces 
are the most critical part of any system.     
5.1.3 Industrial control system 
The ICS runs on the Control Centre PC (Windows XP), and consists of DMS and 
SCADA. These two programs have built-in interfaces, and are designed to be used to-
gether. The data transfer between DMS and SCADA is done by the OPC Data Access 
(DA) and OPC Alarms & Events (A&E) interfaces, so that the servers are on SCADA‘s 
side, and the clients on DMS‘s side. At the current state of the demonstration, the ICS 
cannot send any messages to ThereGate, and its purpose is only to supervise and moni-
tor the system. However, in the future the ICS will also have the ability to send straight 
commands to lower-level equipment. [53.] Figure 5.4 describes the overall layout of the 
ICS.  
Figure 5.3. The layout of the aggregator with mediation components and UI. 
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The OPC UA wrapper has already been developed, and the main focus from the 
demonstration point of view is on the interface between the OES and ICS. In addition, 
in the case of demonstration, the entire ICS system will be working only on one and the 
same computer (PC), which may not be valid in real Smart Grid environment.  
5.2 Information security analysis 
The vulnerabilities found in the demonstration environment are divided into three 
groups: vulnerabilities in hardware, software, and in protocols and communication tech-
nologies. However, the hardware part is left to less attention, the concentration being on 
software and communications.  
5.2.1 Vulnerabilities in hardware 
Embedded systems, such as ThereGate, often have physical constraints, which make 
them more vulnerable. For example, limited processing power can result in DoS. How-
ever, probably the biggest threat concerning ThereGate´s hardware comes from the fact 
that in the future these equipments can be bought and examined in home with all the 
time and privacy. After a vulnerability has been found, it can be used to attack the sys-
tem. 
ThereGate has many physical ports, such as SD Card and USB ports. These inter-
faces enable using rogue devices, especially if not configured right. If, for example, a 
customer´s memory stick is infected with malware, it spreads to ThereGate when the 
user puts the memory stick in the USB port of ThereGate. Disabling all ports as a de-
fault, and denying auto-open feature of memory sticks could prevent at least some 
cases. This, nevertheless, might have a negative effect on the using experience. There-
Gate will also be subject to electricity blackouts and such. If, for instance, a home 
automation security system is integrated to ThereGate, electricity blackouts can cause 
Figure 5.4. The ICS consisting DMS, SCADA and OPC UA wrapper. 
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them to fail. However, ThereGate already has a backup battery place installed in these 
kinds of situations.  
ThereGate includes TPM, specified by Trusted Computing Group. TPM is a secure 
crypto processor that offers secure generation and storing of cryptographic keys, and 
limitation of their use. It is also used to protect passwords from dictionary attacks, still 
allowing a reasonable number of tries. [64; 65.] However, there are also vulnerabilities 
in TPM. These include, for instance, cold boot attacks, where encryption keys are re-
trieved from the OS after using a cold reboot to restart the computer [66].  
Embedded equipment is not the only thing that suffers from computing constraints. 
Heavy software and encryption can bring down even new computers. In the demonstra-
tion environment, software like OES and ICS will require a lot from the PC they are 
running on. If the computers are slow, they are more exposed to DoS attacks.  
5.2.2 Vulnerabilities in software 
The OS is the cornerstone of every system. However, every OS has security holes, some 
more than others. Linux OSs are regarded to be more secure than, for example, Win-
dows OSs. On the other hand, this might lead to a false feel of security. The vulnerabili-
ties of OSs are well-known and compromise the entire system, whereas updates fix old, 
and introduce new vulnerabilities. [67; 68.] Using different OS in different parts of the 
system creates vertical safety, as the adversary cannot use the same OS vulnerability in 
other components of the system. If ThereGate, for example, had some vulnerability in 
its Linux OS the same vulnerability could not be used to attack, for instance, the Agent.  
The OS creates a platform over which other software is working, providing more 
services and such. These additional software also have vulnerabilities, some of which 
are more critical than others. Just like in the OS, it is vital to know the version and patch 
level of the software, as their vulnerabilities are well-known. It is also important to 
know how the software is configured: Bad configuration makes good software risky, 
whereas good configuration mitigates existing security vulnerabilities in the software.  
These vulnerabilities do not apply merely to servers, but also the client software. 
According to SANS, client side attacks are nowadays among the most common attacks. 
Vulnerabilities in client-side software, like browsers, are exploited to compromise com-
puters that have Internet access. The simple act of going to the infected web site may be 
all that is needed. [67.] Firewall, if configured right, can protect the system, and hide 
known vulnerabilities. The demonstration environment includes both servers and 
clients, among other software, each of which possesses possible vulnerabilities.   
The vulnerability does not always have to be a bug in the server or such. It can also 
be a matter of how the system works, and what techniques it uses. The Agent, for ex-
ample, does not verify in any way the content of the JSON files: if the given JSON file 
follows the JSON-lib grammar, it will be accepted. What is more, there is no validation 
of data in any part of the system. It is possible that this feature could be used to make 
data injection type attacks, resulting in loss of sensitive information, DoS, or even ac-
cessing the Agent, for instance. Actually, manipulation of data is probably the most lur-
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ing possibility for the adversaries, and also the most dangerous for the system: changing 
one´s energy bill can be a motivator, and incorrect data can ultimately cause Smart Grid 
to work wrongly. [69.]  
5.2.3 Vulnerabilities in protocols and communication technologies 
One of the main security issues regarding ThereGate has to do with the vulnerabilities 
of the wireless technologies. Z-Wave, for example, only has data encryption in version 
4 [70]. Moreover, the level of encryption cannot in any case be very high, as the mesh 
network would otherwise suffer too much latency. This means that adversaries could 
easily learn one´s Home ID by, for instance, using a sniffer tool, and gain access to the 
Z-Wave network. In that case, it would be possible for the adversary to monitor the 
user´s way of living, violating privacy, or for example, switching lights on and off. 
Moreover, as the product family of Z-Wave continues to grow, other components, such 
as door locks, are implemented, which creates new kinds of threat scenarios [71].    
WLANs are also prone to security vulnerabilities [72, pp. 25-28]. Many of these can 
be taken care of by applying a little effort on configuring the WLAN settings. However, 
some vulnerabilities, for instance, some DoS attacks, are hard, or even impossible to 
mitigate. As all information goes through air, eavesdropping, and conducting MITM 
attacks are serious threats. On the other hand, the propagation areas of both Z-wave and 
WLAN are rather limited, which requires that the adversary is nearby. Moreover, en-
cryption of data is an efficient and easy way to prevent these types of attacks, even 
though most of the WLAN encryption can be cracked rather easily [72, pp. 32, 36]. 
ThereGate supports Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) 2 encryption which is, at the time 
when this thesis is written, the strongest and most recommended form of encryption and 
authentication. There are, nevertheless, vulnerability holes even in WPA2 [73] and the 
recommendation is to use it with other methods, such as extensible authentication pro-
tocol (EAP). 
The hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS) in this demonstration environment 
is using transport layer security (TLS) and SSL. This, however, does not automatically 
mean secure connection, as there are also vulnerabilities in TLS and SSL protocols. One 
found vulnerability of TLS is in its renegotiation feature, which allows a client and 
server, who already have a TLS connection, to negotiate new parameters, generate new 
keys and so on. An attack on this renegotiation logic may result in a MITM attack, 
where the attacker can inject data in an encrypted session, and it will be treated by the 
server as if it came from the client. Thus, a violation of the integrity of information 
would take place. The impact of this type of an attack depends on the application proto-
col running over TLS, in this case HTTP. The initial authentication of a client is done 
with a username/password pair. This authentication state is then kept on with HTTP 
cookies. It is possible that an adversary could exploit this issue by sending a partial 
HTTP request prefixed to the client´s real request. A similar type of attack is possible 
with certificate-based client authentication: it is common that the server lets clients con-
nect and request a resource, after which a certificate is asked. Similar MITM attack 
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would be possible to do, in this case, by using the renegotiation vulnerability. However, 
the attacker would not see any sensitive information directly, as it is sent encrypted via 
server and client. [74; 75.] 
ThereGate also includes SSH connection to enable remote connections. SSH pro-
vides authentication and secure communication over insecure channels. There are, how-
ever, vulnerabilities, like buffer over flows in many sold SHHs, especially in the older 
SSH1 version. These vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the 
privileges of the SHH process: in Windows, SHH runs with system privileges and in 
UNIX with root privileges. [76.] 
The XML documents travel from client to server in the shape of SOAP request. 
XML is then processed within the web service, opening it to XML-based attacks. The 
three most common attacks against web service are buffer overflows, XML injections, 
and session hijackings. In buffer overflow, the adversary can craft XML data that is too 
long, or contains malicious coding, like calling upon itself repetitively. These attacks 
result, among other things, in DoS, and loss of information. In XML injections, the ad-
versary tries to exploit the incorrect data validation by using SOAP messages to create 
XML data which inserts a parameter into an SQL query. There are also other types of 
attacks that exploit the incorrect data validation. For example, in Schema poisoning at-
tack, the adversary tries to change, or replace the XML schema in order to allow the 
parser to process malicious SOAP messages and XML files. Adversary might also gain 
control of some user´s session state by, for example, sniffing SOAP messages, and 
stealing a session ID. This information could then be used to access the application with 
the user´s privileges. [77; 78.]  
OPC UA provides a means to authenticate users, and encrypt the content. Neverthe-
less, the OPC UA protocol does not require authentication or encryption as compulsory. 
From the information security point of view this is really bad, since now the developers 
and companies involved in OPC UA do not use it, as it is not obligatory. [79.] In the 
demonstration environment, neither authentication nor encryption is used in the OPC 
UA protocol. Moreover, the specification accepts self-signed, and other certificates 
without any hesitation.     
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6 DETAILED ANALYSIS AND TEST RESULTS 
This chapter presents three different scenarios of the ownership of ThereGate, analyzing 
and testing them. In the analysis part, most critical interfaces of the system are found, 
whereas in the testing part, interfaces will actually be tested, and the results analyzed. 
The testing is done in cooperation with Codenomicon Ltd. (Oy), who provides very 
useful testing software. 
6.1 Test case analysis 
The Smart Grid demonstration environment, described in chapter three, presented the 
question about the ownership of ThereGate with three possibilities: ThereGate is owned 
by 
A. User  
B. Internet Service Provider (ISP), or  
C. Distribution System Operator (DSO)  
 
As one of these scenarios will actually come to use some day, it is interesting, and 
important to understand what information security issues each possibility brings along. 
This can be done by first analyzing each scenario in order to recognise the interfaces 
that are under danger, and analyzing how this affects to the functionality of the system. 
The testing of the interfaces will help to find vulnerabilities indicating what components 
of each interface need to be protected in order to protect the whole system. 
6.1.1 Customer owns ThereGate 
It is plausible that the customer will have to purchase HEMS equipment, such as 
ThereGate. This means that it is the responsibility of the customer to carry out the in-
formation security of the equipment. This has been the case in many situations with 
cable and Ethernet modems in Finland. Adding more responsibility to end users is in 
some cases necessary. For example, in Finland a new law has been passed that makes 
the use of unprotected WLAN legal [80]. In the Smart Grid environment, however, 
ThereGate is also used by other entities, and not only the customers. This creates a more 
complex environment, including certain requirements for confidentiality, integrity and 
privacy. In what way would it be possible to engage users to take care of the informa-
tion security of ThereGate? Should there be more laws or other financial penalties, if 
ThereGate security has been neglected? What about those users who want to use 
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ThereGate in criminal ways? How much can ISP or DSO, who rely on the integrity of 
the information of ThereGate actually trust ThereGate, if it is managed by users?   
From an information security point of view, this case model allows users to modify, 
and temper ThereGate as they wish. It will make it more alluring to attempt to modify, 
for example, consumption information, in order to gain some profit. One of the most 
popular targets in the system is the OES database, as it has all the user information. 
What is more, in the current version of the demonstration system, the information from 
ThereGate is not validated at any phase of the system. This makes attacks like data in-
jection easier to conduct, making it possible to actually manipulate that consumption 
information, for instance.   
Even if all users would be pure hearted, the level of security varies a great deal, as 
people´s knowledge and know-how of information security varies too. For these rea-
sons, ThereGate cannot be trusted, and should be treated with suspicion. The main at-
tack vectors come from wireless technologies, GUI, and the human factor, having mul-
tiple access routes. The interface under immediate danger is ThereGate´s GUI, as it can 
be accessed via Internet. Also, as ThereGate cannot be trusted, the interface between 
ThereGate and the Agent is under danger. As there are not many security features on the 
higher levels, the whole system can be considered to be under danger. 
There are several ways of breaking these interfaces, and influencing the system that 
have different results. The vulnerabilities, for example, in WLAN, Z-Wave, passwords, 
authentication, encryption, browsers and so forth, are the main access points to the ad-
versaries. Access to ThereGate gives the adversary a chance to modify home device 
settings, possibly causing damage to the premises, like melting the fridge. The adver-
sary may also be able to access classified user information like the social security num-
ber, and alter the information that is sent to the Agent, resulting in manipulation of con-
trolling, billing, and really any service that uses that information. It may also result in 
the adversary gaining access to Agent as well.   
6.1.2 ISP owns ThereGate 
Another plausible scenario is that some ISP, like TeliaSonera, owns ThereGate. This 
means that the ISP is responsible for the safety of ThereGate. Practically, this means 
that there is only that much that a customer can configure, probably not much more than 
certain WLAN settings. This way ThereGate will be a part of the ISP´s information se-
curity system.  
From an information security point of view, this scenario offers a better level of in-
formation security for users and other entities interacting with ThereGate. Nevertheless, 
it is not impossible that adversaries manage to penetrate ThereGate even when an ISP 
owns it. Nevertheless, when an ISP is in charge of the information security of There-
Gate, it will be more secure than it would be in the hands of the end user on average. On 
the other hand, when an ISP owns ThereGate, end users do not have much configuration 
opportunities, such as turning off WLAN, which may, in some cases, worsen informa-
tion security, or at least upset people. Additionally, since it is in the nature of humans to 
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try and bypass restrictions one way or another, ThereGate will provide an alluring chal-
lenge.  
The main attack vectors of this scenario come from the GUI of ThereGate, and from 
the wireless technologies used in ThereGate, such as WLAN and Z-Wave. The human 
factor is also relevant in this scenario, as criminal users are considered as insiders from 
the ISP point of view. In other words, the interface between ThereGate and the Agent 
can also be under attack.   
It is also possible that ThereGate is owned by the customer, but managed by, for ex-
ample, the ISP. This is the case, nowadays, in some cable- Internet/television modems 
that are provided by ISPs; Elisa Oyj, for instance, offers a service that includes the mo-
dem, but there are only few things the customer can configure [81]. On the other hand, 
the customer can buy a similar modem from the store to be able to have more configura-
tion options, and modify the modem, but the ISP will force their own, daily firmware 
updates to every modem anyway. This way, although the customer owns the modem 
and can even do some modifications, the ISP is still controlling it, at least on some 
level. From a security point of view, this situation is very close to the one in which the 
ISP owns ThereGate.  
6.1.3 DSO owns ThereGate 
The third option is that ThereGate is owned by some DSO, meaning that the informa-
tion security is the DSO´s responsibility. A similar situation can be found in the AMI 
architecture, where the AMI meters are in the premises of the customers, but owned by 
DSOs. Old electric meters have had seals to inform the DSO if a violation has been 
made. Same kinds of seals could be applied to ThereGate as well.  Also, as new meters 
are ‗smarter‘, other types of security features can also be added; for instance, logging 
events. [82.] However, in the manner of AMI meters, ThereGate would also require the 
services of some ISP in order to communicate with other systems.  
From an information security point of view, this situation is rather like scenario B, 
where an ISP owns ThereGate. The customer still does not own ThereGate, and has a 
limited access to it, but on the other hand DSO needs to trust on the ISP providing 
communication methods. In other words, DSO buys communication service with secu-
rity features from the ISP. However, as ThereGate is in this case not part of the ISP´s 
security plan, the ISP will simply do things that are mentioned in an agreement between 
the DSO and ISP.  
These services might include a straight VPN from ThereGate to ICS system, for in-
stance. If penetrated, an adversary would have a secured communication path to the 
other side of the VPN tunnel inside the DSO network! The interfaces under attack in 
this scenario are pretty much the same as in scenario B, but the risks are now part of the 
DSO´s security system. 
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6.1.4 Conclusion  
It is clear that, in every scenario, ThereGate plays the most significant role in securing 
the system. Also, the interface between ThereGate and the Agent is very important. De-
pending on the scenario, the responsibility of securing ThereGate and the interface be-
tween ThereGate and the Agent alters, but the fact is that they need to be secured. As 
the role of ThereGate is so significant, it is not likely that scenario A, where customer 
owns ThereGate, is going to materialize. The difference between scenarios B and C, 
from the information security point of view, is rather small. 
Securing ThereGate can prove to be a difficult task. Being the interface for normal 
people to Smart Grid, usability factors also play an important role. As there is a variety 
of users, it is plausible that different types of packages need to be offered to satisfy dif-
ferent needs. In each offered package, information security must be a factor as impor-
tant as usability. 
6.2 Testing plan 
The idea of testing is to find vulnerabilities in the application and, moreover, to under-
stand the root cause behind these vulnerabilities. According to OWASP testing method-
ology, testing should not only addressed equipment, but also the people using the 
equipment, their methods, and so forth. [83.] However, in the scope of this thesis, only 
equipment is going to be tested. The testing will be done more from a vulnerability as-
sessment point of view than that of penetration testing. Thus, using tools like Metasploit 
are left to less attention, and the focus is on finding vulnerabilities.   
The best way of conducting a comprehensive test would be to involve both internal 
and external tests. The internal perspective resembles the situation where attacks come 
from inside of the organisation´s safety perimeter, for example, insider attacks, whereas 
the external perspective resembles outside attacks. However, resources are often lim-
ited, and full, comprehensive tests cannot be conducted. [14, pp.109-112] In this test, 
the external perspective is used, as the idea is to simulate real communication situation, 
and test its information security. However, this thesis also includes internal test results 
from ThereGate, as it was selected as a target in an automation system security auditing 
course at TUT Department of Automation Science and Engineering.  
6.2.1 Target and layout  
This test will concentrate on public interfaces, as they are the most vulnerable parts of 
the system. However, wireless technologies such as Z-Wave and WLAN are left out of 
the scope. The idea of the testing is to simulate a real communication situation, and ana-
lyse the information security of that system. The goal of information security is to se-
cure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system. Figure 6.1 presents 
what kind of system the testing simulates, and also which interfaces are to be tested.  
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As presented in the conclusion of the analysis, ThereGate and the interface between 
ThereGate and the Agent are the two most important parts of the system in every sce-
nario. Thus, the main concentration of testing will be at ThereGate and in HTTPS.   
6.2.2 Used tools 
The tools presented here, are used in the actual testing part. These tools have been se-
lected for their suitability and popularity. Other tools can also be used for similar pur-
poses. [1, pp. 114-130; 84] All, except, Codenomicon´s Defensics, are free of charges to 
personal usage.  
For port scanning, and mapping the network structure, software called Nmap ver-
sion 5.59 beta 1 is used. Nmap uses raw IP packets to identify hosts, services, the OS, 
and other characteristics. The command line format for running Nmap is following: 
 
nmap [Scan Type(s)] [Options] <host or net #1...[#N]> 
―LV automation  
Network‖ 
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Figure 6.1. Simulated testing environment with interfaces. 
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Nmap also provides a graphical interface called Zenmap, which provides easier way 
of using the tool, and visualization of results. Both software can be downloaded from 
http://nmap.org. [85.]  
For monitoring and saving network traffic, Tcpdump version 4.1.1 and Wireshark 
version 1.6.4 is used: Tcpdump is used to capture the traffic and Wireshark to analyze it. 
Using this combination is rather efficient, as Wireshark has more restrictions in captur-
ing traffic than Tcpdump, but on the other hand, with Wireshark, it is much easier to 
analyze the traffic. Tcpdump can be downloaded from www.tcpdump.org, and Wire-
shark from www.wireshark.org. [86:87.]  
For vulnerability scanning, Tenable Nessus version 4.4.1, and Nexpose version 5.0.3 
are used. These tools are network vulnerability scanners that can identify hosts currently 
connected on the network, and any vulnerable services or applications that are running. 
Nessus scans were done on the auditing class. Nessus is free of charges to personal us-
age only (HomeFeed), and can be downloaded from www.tenable.com. Nexpose´s 
Community Edition is free of charge, and can be downloaded from 
http://www.rapid7.com/vulnerability-scanner.jsp. [31; 88.] 
Nessus scanner includes a number of plugins for web application scanning, testing 
vulnerabilities like SQL injection, XSS, HTTP header injection, directory traversal, re-
mote file inclusion, and command execution. However, as web applications are complex 
and unique, automated vulnerability scanners cannot reveal all vulnerabilities, thus also 
missing some of the critical ones. [89.] This limitation needs to be taken into account, 
and other solutions need to be used to provide enough testing coverage. One tool for 
testing web interfaces is w3af. W3af is open-source, and can be downloaded from 
http://w3af.sourceforge.net/. [90.] 
For the penetrating test, software called Metasploit Framework 4.2.0 and Armitage 
version 11.22.11 are used. These tools continue where vulnerability scanning ends by 
trying to exploit known vulnerabilities to attack the target system. The Armitage is a 
type of UI and management software for Metasploit. Armitage can be downloaded 
freely from http://www.fastandeasyhacking.com/. Metasploit offers a community edi-
tion free of charges with less functionality, and slower update circles for exploits than 
the licensed versions. Metasploit can be downloaded from www.metasploit.com. 
[91;92] 
Other software used for attacking against the system is Ettercap version 0.7.4- Laza-
rus. This software is used especially for conducting MITM attacks on local area net-
work. Ettercap includes sniffing live connections, content filtering on the fly, and many 
other features. Ettercap can be downloaded for free from 
http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/. [93] 
For fuzz testing, Codenomicon Defensics test platform is used. This tool is meant 
for robustness testing, and to find flaws from protocols. It sends fuzzed information to 
the test target, and tries to find flaws. The tool itself consists of many other tools, and a 
large variety of protocol test suites are available. The two fuzzer software are Traffic 
Capture Fuzzer, and Universal Fuzzer. The Traffic Capture Fuzzer analyzes the traffic, 
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and creates a test model based on that information, whereas Universal Fuzzer test cases 
are generated from sample template files. Neither of the tools requires protocol specifi-
cation. More information of Codenomicon and their software can be found at 
www.codenomicon.com [94]. 
All tools, except for Codenomicon´s Defensics, are already preinstalled in Back-
Track 5 tool collection. However, some updating is required in order to use the latest 
versions of these software. The BackTrack can be downloaded free of charge from 
www.backtrack-linux.org [95]. The following bullet list and Figure 6.2 represent how 
the used tools work on different layers of the OSI model. 
 
 
Nessus: vulnerability scanning /3 
W3af: web application vulnerability scanning /3 
Metasploit: penetrating test /3 
Nmap /Zenmap: scanning network /1, 2, 3 
Tcpdump/Wireshark: Monitoring and saving network 
traffic /1, 2 
Codenomicon Defensics: fuzz-testing interfaces /1, 2, 3 
Ettercap: MITM testing suite /1, 2, 3 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, the testing tools cover the different layers of the OSI model rather 
well. This is important in order to have a more comprehensive picture of the informa-
tion security of the system.   
6.2.3 Testing methodology 
There are several testing methodologies to follow, each taking a bit of a different route. 
However, from each major methodology, a general approach can be found. This ap-
proach can be divided into four phases, which are: reconnaissance, discovery, vulner-
ability identification, and penetration [14, pp. 112-119]. 
This testing is done more in the spirit of white-box testing than black-box testing, as 
the tester knows IP addresses of the computers and such. Thus, the reconnaissance 
phase can be left to less attention. In this case, a more suitable approach for testing is 
the Homeland Security´s Hands-on Control Systems Cyber Security Training process, 
where the testing process is divided into four steps [96]: 
1. Network Discovery 
2. Vulnerability Analysis 
3. Network Traffic Analysis 
4. Network Exploitation 
1 
2 
3 
TCP/IP OSI 
Application 
Transport
  
Internet 
Link 
Application 
Network 
Data link 
Physical 
Presentation 
Session 
Transport 
Figure 6.2. Illustration of used software in different level of layers. 
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These four steps are also used in the testing phase, although in a different order. The 
following sub chapters describe in more detail what each of these steps includes. 
Step 1. Network Discovery – Nmap 
The first things to do, when auditing information security of any system, is to get infor-
mation of which services and ports are open. From this information, it is easy to com-
pare which ports should be open, and which ports really are open. It is also an important 
part of the awareness of how the system works, and what it consists of.  
Step 2. Vulnerability Analysis – Nessus, Nexpose, w3af and Defensics 
One significant factor in information security is to be aware of the versions of software 
used in the system. Especially the old versions are subject to vulnerabilities, which 
makes keeping software up-to-date important. Vulnerability scans can reveal not only 
the versions of the software and their vulnerabilities, but also other very important 
things, such as weak cipher supports, DoS vulnerabilities and so forth. Knowing which 
ports are open, and which OS is used really helps to select right plugins to the vulner-
ability scan. Not only does it speed up the process, but it can also have an impact on the 
scan as well.  
There are also vulnerabilities in protocols. As the communication protocols are the 
cornerstone of the communication, it is important to know their vulnerabilities and test 
them, in order to gain a more comprehensive test coverage.    
Step 3. Network Traffic Analysis – Tcpdump and Wireshark 
In order to really know what information using which protocol is going to whom in the 
system, it is necessary to capture traffic, and analyze it. This is also an important part of 
fuzz-testing, as it requires a deeper understanding of protocols, and example sequences 
of protocols. Another important thing that can be discovered from the captured traffic is 
how the protocols have been done; for example, how the sequences change.  
Step 4. Network Exploitation – Ettercap and Metasploit with Armitage  
The results of the vulnerability scan can be used to exploit the vulnerability, and to try 
and penetrate the system under test. This part of the testing can require a deeper knowl-
edge of programming, but there are also automated exploits that do not require much of 
an understanding.  
Successful penetration of the system works as an example visualizing the fact that 
that information security issues are not irrelevant, or cannot be exploited. This is practi-
cal especially when trying to make the decision makers understand the importance of 
information security. [14, p. 110.] 
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6.2.4 Execution of testing 
The actual testing is done in two parts. In the first series of testing, the equipment is 
scanned with Nmap, Nessus and w3af to find known vulnerabilities. This information is 
then used with Metasploit to attack each computer, one at a time. The second testing 
series concentrate in using Codenomicon´s Defensics and Ettercap against the interfaces 
of the system. In both parts, Tcpdump and Wireshark are used to monitor and analyze 
the traffic. Especially in the second part, Wireshark is used to get the right kind of data 
information to Defensics. Figure 6.3 below presents the actual testing configuration 
layout.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As can be noticed, the testing is done using only one testing computer and one 
monitoring computer. All devices are connected to each other with a switch. As ICS is 
located in a different room, a wireless link is used to connect it to the system. Another 
noticeable thing is that Agent and Northbound Mediator are located in the same com-
puter. 
6.3 Testing results 
The following test results have been gained by using the previously presented four step 
testing methodology. During the testing, the system was working normally. In this case, 
this means that the information from ThereGate went through the system, ending up to 
the ICS. However, as during the testing ThereGate´s GUI or SSH, for instance, were not 
used, they are not included in normal traffic in this case.     
Figure 6.3. The layout of the actual testing. 
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ThereGate is one of the most important equipment of the system, as it is the cus-
tomer interface to the system. As a part of an auditing course (ACI-31070 Advanced 
Course in Network Based Automation, Fall 2012: Automation system auditing) of TUT, 
ThereGate was analyzed more closely by one group (participants Mikko Salmenperä, 
Marko Seppälä, and Kim Paananen). Some of the material of this information security 
auditing that was not revealed in the white box-testing is presented here. ThereGate was 
chosen for target because it was considered to be the most vulnerable, and at the same 
time, a crucial part of Smart Grid. 
As the penetration testing with Metasploit did not result in penetration of any of the 
computers, it has been left out of the results. The Nmap and Nessus scan results for each 
computer are represented in appendix A. The results from other tools used are presented 
in the text. 
6.3.1 Open ports and services  
Interfaces are connection points to the system; they are used for communication with 
other computers and systems. Behind every interface is software, a service, which is 
using transmission control protocol/user datagram protocol (TCP/UDP) ports for com-
munication. These interfaces are also the ones that adversaries use to attack against the 
system; they are trying to find vulnerability of interface, and exploit that to penetrate the 
system. It is especially the remotely accessible network services that are under serious 
threats. Common flaws, like poor configuration of web servers, mail servers, file and 
print servers, and DNS servers installed by default, often without a need for the given 
service, are the paths that the adversaries use. Additionally, many software automati-
cally install services turning them on as part of installation, without any word to the 
administrator. These excess services that are not used in normal activity of the system 
only enlarge the attack surface, and possess vulnerabilities that adversaries may exploit 
to penetrate the system. [97.]  
Findings from the testing 
According to Nmap scan, there are four open ports in ThereGate. However, closer 
analysis of the captured traffic with WireShark reveals that only TCP port number 443 
is used, when the system is working normally. As no SSH connections were used in the 
testing, TCP port number 22 was not used. However, there are two HTTP servers that 
are listening to different ports: Apache on TCP port 443 and CherryPy on TCP port 
8080. The idea behind using two servers in this environment is that only one of the 
servers is communicating to outside of the system. This indicates that there is some sort 
of a configuration flaw in ThereGate´s software. 
 Other interesting port found by Nmap scan is the TCP port number 53. This port is 
used by the DNS server, over which a TCP wrapper service is working. This service can 
be used to deny or allow access to various services on the machine using access list 
rules [98]. TCP wrappers are actually a very important part of Unix´s information secu-
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rity. However, the access list must be done properly. DNS server, if not needed, should 
be disabled, or restrict the access to internal hosts only, if the service is available exter-
nally. 
The Nmap scan result from OES shows that there are 12 TCP, and four UDP ports 
open in the OES. Most of the services running in these ports are necessary for the sys-
tem. However, from the analysis of the captured traffic, it can be seen that only a few 
ports are used during normal communication with other components: TCP ports number 
8080 and 1521.  These ports are the connection points to the Agent and Northbound 
Mediator. As no SSH connections were used in the testing, TCP port number 22 was not 
used. This means that there might be some ports open for no good reason. For example, 
TCP port number 9100 is used by a service called jetdirect, which is a printing service. 
This port might be used, for example, to steal sensitive information, thus having an im-
pact on the confidentiality [99]. Other interesting ports and services, which are neces-
sary to check, include SSH service in port 22, and HTTP servers in port 80 and 8086.   
The list of open ports in the ICS computer is rather long, while there is only one port 
used during normal communication with other components; TCP port number 4850. 
This port is used between the connection with Northbound and the ICS. What is inter-
esting about this is that Nmap scan or other vulnerability scanners did not reveal the 
port number 4850 at all. This indicates that some sort of firewall or other restricting 
feature is used in the ICS.  
The rather numerous listing of open ports is due to the fact that in a normal running 
environment, ICS is a part of TUT´s domain and office network. However, it can be 
clearly seen that some hardening has already taken place in the ICS computer. Never-
theless, these open ports should be dealt with, one by one, making sure that each of 
them has a needed function in the system.  
The Agent/Northbound (later Client) computer includes the client sides of the inter-
faces, meaning that there should not be too many open ports. Only the connection be-
tween the Agent and OES, which uses SOAP, requires that both ends include server and 
client sides. There are, however, some ports open, the purpose of which is not clear 
from the information communication point of view: HTTP service in port 5357, and 
apj13 service in port 8009.  
Probably the most interesting part of the Client computer analysis is the traffic 
analysis, as it includes all the client sides of the interfaces. During normal usage of the 
system, the Agent has connections to ThereGate´s port number 433, and OES´s port 
number 8080, whereas Northbound has connections to OES´s port number 1521, and 
ICS´s port number 4850. Table 6.1 presents the connections that are the core of the 
communication system of the testing environment. 
The TCP port number of client side usually changes over time. In SOAP communi-
cation, each party has both server and client side, taking turns in which is the sending 
and which the receiving party. The one that is sending always has port number 8080. 
This has been illustrated in the table by showing that both ends of the interface have the 
same port number. 
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Table 6.1. The interfaces of the system with IPs, ports and names. 
Server  IP Port   Client  IP Port 
ThereGate 172.16.205.15 443 <- Agent 172.16.205.41 many 
OES 172.16.205.95 8080 <-> Agent 172.16.205.41 8080 
OES 172.16.205.95 1521 <- Northbound 172.16.205.41 many 
ICS 172.16.14.236 4850 <- Northbound 172.16.205.41 many 
 
Table 6.2. Overall TCP traffic of the system from the analysis. 
Destination PC Destination port Percent of TCP traffic 
OES 9402 73 % 
ICS 3389 16 % 
ThereGate 443 3 % 
ICS 4850 3 % 
OES 8080 2 % 
OES 1521 1 % 
 
The analysis of the captured traffic, however, reveals that the system uses other 
ports and servers as well. Table 6.2 above presents the data flow from clients to servers. 
As it can be seen, 89% of the Client TCP traffic is something else than core communi-
cation traffic (highlighted with colour red). However, further analysis indicates that the 
TCP port 3389 is used for remote host terminal connection between the ICS and Client 
computer. For this reason, there are several ports open in both ICS and Client com-
puters. In the real environment, however, this connection does not exist.  
Another unknown open port, 9402, is used by IBM WebSphere Application Server 
for Common Secure Interoperability Version 2 (CSIv2), which is an authentication pro-
tocol. CSIv2 is implemented in WebSphere Application Server, and is used for imple-
menting security features. [100.] According to the traffic capture, the parties of this 
connection are OES Server CA0, and OES User CA0. This connection is used by OES 
UI, which is used from the Client computer. WebSphere, and especially the application 
server, have numerable vulnerabilities, the most common being the DoS vulnerabilities 
[101; 102]. As OES is built on this software, these vulnerabilities can have a severe im-
pact on the whole system.  
Remediation 
Every entity should make a baseline of what services and ports should be open. Net-
work scanners, like Nmap, can be used to discover services provided to the inside and 
outside of the networks. These scans should be done regularly, and against the baseline. 
Especially any server that is visible from a public network, like the Internet, should be 
verified. Services that are not essential for business should be removed. Critical ser-
vices, like DNS, file, mail, web, and database servers should be operated on separate 
physical host machines. Applying host-based firewall or port filtering tools, with a de-
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fault deny-rule to all traffic, except that explicitly allowed, is essential. If unauthorized 
traffic or service is noticed, it should be blocked, and an alarm generated. [97.] 
6.3.2 Version of software 
One significant factor of information security is to be aware of the versions of software 
used in the system. Adversaries are constantly scanning an organization´s network look-
ing for vulnerable versions of software. Especially old versions are subject to vulner-
abilities that are well-known, and against which there are automated exploits to use. 
Adversaries also use web content, for instance, files, documents, pictures and so on, to 
attack and compromise target machines with malware, exploiting client side software 
vulnerabilities, like flaws in the browser. [97.] 
Findings from the testing 
According to the Nessus scan report, four high, and two medium severity problems 
come from a used hypertext preprocessor (PHP) 5.3 version, whereas one high, and four 
medium security problems comes from a used Apache 2.2 version. Each of these prob-
lems holds in them multiple vulnerabilities, which, if exploited, may result in different 
ways from DoS to full penetration of the system. There are also other software that use 
the old version. For example, ThereGate uses mod_ssl version 2.2.15, which is vulner-
able to a remote buffer overflow, possibly leading to allowing a remote shell (CVE-
2002-0082 and OSVDB-756). Outdated software is not so uncommon in embedded 
equipment, but nevertheless possesses great vulnerabilities.  
Obviously, the servers of the OES have been configured more precisely, and are 
more up-to-date than those of ThereGate´s, for according to the Nessus´s report, there is 
only one high severity problem in the OES. However, there are problems that are due to 
the used version of software. For example, the installed version of Mort Bay Jetty is 
prone to multiple XSS vulnerabilities, which can, for instance, be used for stealing one´s 
identity, thus having an impact on confidentiality. Also the used version of Apache is 
prone for DoS. 
With Nessus scan, it is also clear that the ICS computer has been hardened. There 
are only one high, and two medium severity problems that Nessus can find. The biggest 
problem, it seems, is vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server that could allow remote 
code execution (CVE-2008-5416). Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to 
take complete control of the system. Also, used version of the remote desktop protocol 
server is vulnerable to a MITM attack.  
The result from Nessus scan reveals that there is not a single high severity problem 
in the Agent computer. There are, however, seven medium severity problems, six out of 
seven of which are due to the old version of Apache Tomcat. These problems hold in 
them multiple vulnerabilities, such as XSS and DoS.  
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Remediation 
To protect the system against these types of attacks, it is essential to keep the software 
up-to-date and patched. Especially for the software that has to do with a public network, 
such as the Internet, it is important to install security updates as soon they are released. 
Being a part of a software development society and email lists can also give a heads up, 
and more time to patch one´s software. In order to gain better protection, it is also essen-
tial that the end users are using secure client software. Informing customers how to 
make, for example, browsers more secure is a good practice, and should be presented, 
for instance, on a company´s website. [103.] 
6.3.3 Software configuration 
The way software has been configured has a huge impact on the information security of 
the entire system. Default configurations are often insecure and concentrated more on 
the easiness of use and deployment. Adversaries are also aware of the default setting 
and other most common configuration flaws, and are constantly searching for such 
software. These flaws are highways for adversaries to the system. [97] 
Findings from the testing 
The configuration problems of ThereGate are much more than just giving out informa-
tion about the equipment. At the current status of ThereGate, due to the configuration 
flaws, it would be extremely easy for an adversary to penetrate the system. For example, 
configurations of PHP and Apache server have been done extremely wrong, enabling 
the adversary to penetrate the system simply using the browser. Of course, one has to 
remember that ThereGate is equipment under development, and many things will be 
changed in the commercial version. However, some of the flaws only make the devel-
opment much harder, and also, it is more likely that some of the flaws remain, and end 
up in the commercial version. The following examples present some of the configura-
tion flaws found from ThereGate (usernames and passwords have been changed).  
 
Only one user - root 
root:$1$YyZk36/l$xAVSoPxiMnc0dc4125LFI/:0:0:root:/tmp:/bin/
bash 
nobody:*:65534:65534:nobody:/var:/bin/false 
messagebus:!:10:10:messagebus:/var:/bin/bash 
 
Apache configuration flaw 
<Directory /> 
  Options FollowSymLinks  
  AllowOverride None 
  Order deny,allow  
  Allow from all 
</Directory> 
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PHP configuration flaw  
root@TG-0000003:~# cat 
sess_71e56950ad368b005365a9fe0678e576 
user-
name|s:5:"admininistrator";password|s:11:"qwerty1234";error
|N;success|N; 
 
As can be seen, there are many flaws in the configurations of ThereGate. Other 
flaws not presented here include directory enumeration, password auto complete, and so 
forth. These flaws can be used to gain complete access to ThereGate, violating all goals 
of the CIA. 
Remediation 
The basic things to do are to change default passwords as soon as possible, and delete 
example files from the server. However, it is necessary that before installing any soft-
ware, especially a server, to familiarize yourself with articles on common configuration 
flaws, and best practice lists. Avoiding most common flaws, and configuring the server 
according to best practice gives an excellent starting point to make a baseline that can 
be used to monitor changes. 
6.3.4 Information disclosure 
Information disclosure, a situation where systems make information, such as details of 
installed software available to an outside person, is a rather common flaw of many sys-
tems. Although it may seem harmless, this vulnerability is, in fact, a serious flaw, since 
finding out, for example, the version of Apache helps the adversary to find the right, 
well-known vulnerabilities to exploit, in order to attack against the system. [104.]  
Findings from the tested computers 
From each of the computers, remote services with their version numbers can be de-
tected. For example, ICS Microsoft SQL server version is 9.0.2039.0, hosted in port 
1104. However, compared to ThereGate and the OES, the ICS and Agent are not reveal-
ing that much information.  
OES, for its part, reveals a great deal of information, giving out, for example, names 
and versions of http Jetty server, IBM WebSphere Application Server, and remote 
transparent network substrate (TNS) listener. Each of these components has well-known 
vulnerabilities, giving, again, one excellent starting point for an adversary. For example, 
Oracle TNS protocol can fail to properly validate an authentication request, and Jetty 
HTTP server could allow a remote attacker to gain access to files outside the normal 
document tree [105; 106; 107]. 
From the Nmap and w3af scan results, it can be seen that ThereGate reveals too 
much information, giving out the names and versions of SSH, HTTP and SSL servers. 
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The scan also reveals the name and version of the OS, giving the adversary a great start-
ing point. The error messages also reveal an awful lot of information, as presented in 
Figure 6.4 below.   
  
 
 
Figure 6.4. ’Bad Request’- message from ThereGate revealing too much information. 
 
As can be seen, the error message is rather informative, and reveals sensitive infor-
mation. There are also other information disclosure issues, such as Easter Eggs, and the 
Internet control message protocol (ICMP) timestamp response. For example, from 
https://172.16.205.15/index.php/?=PHPB8B5F2A0-3C92-11d3-A3A9-4C7B08C10000, 
some sensitive information can be seen.  
Remediation 
To protect the server from revealing too much information, one must configure the 
server right. Hiding the server number and other sensitive information is a matter of 
configuration, for example in Apache:  
 
ServerSignature Off and ServerTokens Prod  
 
However, security should not only rely on hiding things, but concentrate also on 
other solutions, like restricting access to a certain server, allowing only specific IPs. 
Other things that are often left to servers are the so called Easter eggs. While most of 
them reveal only funny pictures, some reveal sensitive information about the server. 
These Easter eggs, and other information disclosure features should be disabled. For 
example, setting ‗expose_php‘ to ‗Off‘ in PHP configuration file, – php.ini – disables 
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one information disclosure feature. Controlling the error messages is also a very impor-
tant issue. Using a generic error message that does not reveal too much information is a 
good practice. [97; 18.] 
6.3.5 Protocol flaws 
One important part of any ICT system is communication protocols. Although many of 
these protocols, for instance, TCP or IP, have been used for a long time, they still have 
vulnerabilities. There are also newer protocols, and more seldom used protocols possi-
bly possessing yet unknown vulnerabilities. As these protocols are the foundation of 
communication, and used by software and application, the vulnerabilities of these pro-
tocols can be severe. One of the easiest ways to exploit protocol flaws is to create some 
sort of a DoS attack, thus mostly impacting the availability. There are, however, more 
dangerous threats that these vulnerabilities possess, like allowing MITM types of at-
tacks.  
There are many vulnerabilities in protocols, and in how they, for example, establish 
connection. For example, the TCP connection-establishment mechanism could be used 
to perform a DoS attack by sending a large number of connection requests to the target 
system. This attack is also known as ―SYN flood‖, and it prevents the target system 
from establishing connections with legitimate users. Another type of an attack against 
TCP is hijacking the connection. To do this, the attacker must learn the sequence num-
ber from the ongoing communication, and forge a false segment that looks like the next 
segment. [108] IP protocol, too, has vulnerabilities; for example, IP spoofing, where 
adversary creates IP packets with a forged source IP address, in order to conceal the 
identity of the sender, or impersonate someone else. [107; 109.]  
Computers communicate with each other via Ethernet (MAC) addresses. Address 
resolution protocol (ARP) is a mechanism that matches IP addresses with the addresses 
in an Ethernet network. This is done with broadcast messages that are sent to every 
computer. ARP poisoning is a MITM type of attack that exploits the ARP mechanism. 
ARP attacks, which can allow taking control of the packet flow, can be combined to 
TCP hijacking attacks in order to get permanent control of the hijacked TCP connection. 
[107; 110.]  
Findings from the testing 
One of the most relevant TCP ports of ThereGate is port number 433 that is used by 
both Agent and the GUI, and port number 22 that is used for SSH connection. The pro-
tocols that are communicating using port number 433 are TCP, HTTP and TLS. How-
ever, there are also other lower level protocols that are being used in the communication 
including ARP, ICMP, and IP protocols. All these protocols are ones that fuzz-testing 
concentrates on. The results from Codenomicon Defensics fuzzer software are repre-
sented in Table 6.3.  
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Table 6.3. The results of ThereGate´s interfaces from Defensics. 
Protocol ARP ICMP IPv4 TCP HTTP TLS SSH 
Port - - - 443 443 443 22 
Verdict Pass Pass Fail Fail Pass/fail Pass Pass 
 
 
Table 6.4. The results of OES´s interfaces from Defensics. 
Protocol ARP IPv4 TCP HTTP SOAP TNS 
Port - - 8080 8080 8080 1521 
Verdict Pass Fail Fail Pass/fail Pass Pass 
 
As can be noticed, the higher level protocols did rather well in the test. Two proto-
cols, however, did fail, those being IPv4 and TCP. In order to make the results more 
accurate, same tests were performed several times. Also, Defensics make it possible to 
run only the failed test cases, which speeds testing a lot. In the table, these have been 
presented in the verdict section with the following logic: if all tests were passed, the 
verdict is pass, if any of the tests were failed, the verdict is fail. If the result changed 
with the same test, the verdict is pass/fail. For example, HTTP passed the majority of 
tests, but failed two times with the same payload used. However, when the same pay-
load and tests were done again, HTTP passed. Maybe in order to fail, HTTP needed 
some other impulse from, for example, the Agent, and, together with testing traffic re-
sulted in failure.  
The protocols that communicate using TCP port number 8080 are TCP, HTTP, and 
SOAP, whereas the protocols using TCP port number 1521 are TCP, and TNS. Other 
open ports, like 22, used by SSH, were left out of the scope. Table 6.4 above presents 
which protocols were tested, which port they used, and the verdict of the test result.  
Just like with ThereGate, the only protocols to fail in fuzz-testing were IPv4, and 
TCP. HTTP protocol also behaved in a similar manner: in the first runs, it did not fail, 
but on the tests run second, it failed. The TNS protocol was tested using Traffic Capture 
software, as there were no ready test suites to that protocol. SOAP was also tested using 
this, as well as the SOAP test suite software. The Traffic Capture cannot provide as vast 
a testing coverage as protocol Test Suites, but nevertheless, gives at least some results. 
As OES is a high level part of the Smart Grid demonstration environment, a successful 
DoS attack would have a large impact on the availability of the entire system. 
As there is only one interesting port - port 4850 – the fuzz-testing concentrates on 
this port. The OPC-UA TCP protocol was tested using Traffic Capture software, as  
there were no ready test suites to that protocol. Table 6.5 presents which protocols were 
tested, which port they used, and the verdict of the test result.  
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Table 6.5. The results of ICS´s interfaces from Defensics. 
Protocol ARP IPv4 OPC-UA TCP 
Port - - 4850 
Verdict Fail Fail Pass 
 
Unlike any other component, ICS is the only one to fail the ARP protocol test. The 
used OPC-UA TCP implementation in the demonstration environment has been devel-
oped in TUT, and follows that specification [111]. Testing of OPC-UA TCP was rather 
hard due to the long handshake of the protocol. Nevertheless, the implementation seems 
to be rather solid.  
However, some issues were found in the OPC-UA TCP implementation when ana-
lyzing the traffic. For example; the sequences start from zero, enabling the adversary to 
count what will be the next sequence, and possibility to perform a connection hijacking 
attack. Another found vulnerability is that if data is sent in several packages, the OPC-
UA Server waits until it receives the last package. This can be used for DoS attacks. 
Because of the limited resources, client side testing of interfaces was left out of the 
scope. It should, nevertheless, be mentioned that client side testing should also be per-
formed in order to gain better testing coverage.   
Remediation 
To protect the system against protocol flaws may seem hard, if not even impossible. 
However, there are many ways to protect, or at least to diminish the impact and threat of 
these vulnerabilities. For example, against ARP poisoning, static ARP can be used 
where IP to MAC mappings are done manually. There are also surveillance tools, such 
as Arpwatch or Snort, which can be used to monitor unusual behaviour in the network. 
However, the most important thing is to design and implement the system correctly. 
Restricting what kind of information is allowed to a certain port is one example of im-
proving the security. [109.] 
6.3.6 Encryption of information 
The thing that the adversaries are after, the asset, in the digital world, is information. As 
almost any ICT system of today consists of several components communicating with 
each other, it means that sensitive information needs to be transferred via communica-
tion lines. If this information is transferred in plain-text, it is extremely easy for adver-
saries to eavesdrop this traffic, resulting in data loss. This information could be used, for 
example, to impersonate a person or equipment, and gain authorized access to the sys-
tem. In order to protect the transmission, encryption is used. However, not all encryp-
tion methods are that strong, and are prone for vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are 
well-known, and constantly searched by adversaries.  
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Findings from the testing  
The already known fact, that is, the fact that encryption is used only between ThereGate 
and the Agent, was confirmed with analysis of the traffic. Encryption could, neverthe-
less, be used between all connections.  
One of the most important parts of ThereGate and the whole demonstration envi-
ronment is the web application interface, used by GUI and Agent. For this reason, 
HTTPS is also a crucial part of the system. As the older versions of TLS and SSL have 
well-known vulnerabilities, it is recommendable to use the newest ones. However, in 
the current version of ThereGate, SSL 2.0 is supported, as well as weak cipher suites. 
SSL 2.0 has well-known vulnerabilities and should not be supported at all. All in all, 
according to Nessus´s report, vulnerabilities in SSL cause four medium severity prob-
lems, and a few low severity problems as well. 
One of the most recent vulnerabilities of SSL is the renegotiation issue [63]. This 
vulnerability was tested with special software created for this purpose only, thc-ssl-dos 
[112]. The result of the test indicates that renegotiations of SSL has been disabled, thus 
making the attack unsuccessful.   
Remediation 
To protect information, secure transmission protocols should be used. Even better is to 
use secure protocols that work in different layers at the same time, using, for example, 
IPSec and TLS. It is also essential to use strong versions of these secure protocols, and 
disable the support of old vulnerable versions, like SSL version 2.0. One way to check if 
the system is supporting weak SSL version 2.0, is to use simple command line testing, 
for instance: 
 
openssl s_client -connect target:port -ssl2 –cipher 
'LOW:NULL:aNULL:EXPORT' [113, pp. 34-35]. 
 
However, the key is in the planning process. The solution needs to take into account 
the long life span of software and equipment, and provide means to update encryption 
mechanisms to meet the standards of that time.  
6.3.7 Authentication  
Authentication is an essential part of any system, especially web applications. Knowing 
that the parties are who they claim to be is important, as otherwise no trust can be at-
tained. There are, however, vulnerabilities in used authentication methods and proce-
dures; for example, poorly designed application or login forms. Adversaries use brute 
force attacks, phishing email, MITM attacks, and many other attacks to learn creden-
tials, or to bypass the authentication, as it is much easier than hacking into the system. If 
an adversary is authenticated falsely to the system, it can have devastating conse-
quences.  
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Findings from the testing 
The already known fact that there is some sort of client authentication between every 
component, except between Northbound and ICS, was verified with closer analysis of 
the traffic. The result unveils that the credentials used in authentication of clients are not 
that secure, and are subject to brute force attacks. As no encryption was used in these 
connections, the analysis of the credentials was rather straightforward. 
Between ThereGate and the Agent, however, the situation is a bit different. It is 
typical that only the server is authenticated in HTTPS transactions, just like in this case, 
opening it to MITM attacks. In many situations, server authentication is enough, as it is 
only important to secure that the server is who it claims to be. In the Smart Grid envi-
ronment, however, it is crucial to authenticate the client too. This means that HTTPS 
client must have a personal certificate in order to authenticate themselves. Usually these 
certificates must be signed by a CA, which is trusted by the server. In the demonstration 
environment, however, the client side authentication is done by using simple user-
name/password authentication, and the server side certificates are not issued by a trusted 
CA. These create a false feeling of security and can have an impact on the confidential-
ity, and integrity of the system. In the commercial version of ThereGate, a certificate 
like X.509 is most likely used.  
With software called Ettercap, different types of MITM attacks are possible to con-
duct [114]. The result from MITM attack between ThereGate and the Agent is most 
exciting, as it was the only one to use encryption. The result of this attack is presented 
below (username and password has been changed): 
 
HTTP : 172.16.205.15:443 -> USER: administrator  PASS: 
qwerty1234  INFO: 172.16.205.15/api/login?username= 
adminstrator&password=qwerty1234 
 
As can be seen, Ettercap was successful in breaking SSL, and as a result, username 
and password are gained in plain-text. This is due to the fact that the client accepted the 
invalid certificate, which Ettercap provided. This is one example why self-signed, ex-
pired, or otherwise problematic certificates can be serious threats to the system. 
Remediation 
It is important to use secure transmission protocols, like HTTPS, when transmitting cre-
dentials, or other sensitive information. Planning and implementing the authentication 
procedure correctly is also essential. For example, by using HTTP POST and 
TYPE=PASSWORD in transmission. Using client side authentication as well improves 
the security of the system, as it is harder to conduct MITM attacks or impersonate 
someone. The widely used username - password combination, however, has been 
proved to be vulnerable, and does not alone provide sufficient security for more sensi-
tive information. A more secure option is two-factor authentication, where user must 
provide something he or she knows, like username-password combination, and some-
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thing he or she owns, like hardware token, mobile phone or biometrics for instance 
[115]. However, even this solution has its problems [116.] 
Client certificates should only be used when needed, as they have their own prob-
lems, like the management of the certificates. If used, they should be supported with 
hardware, like a TPM. The recent events of hacked CAs do not help the situation either, 
as the number of trustworthy entities has decreased [117]. As the reliability of the CAs 
has shaken, other more secure solutions need to be planned and used. In the demonstra-
tion environment, a simple public key infrastructure (SPKI) type of solution could work 
better, as there is no need for commercial CAs. 
6.3.8 Other found issues 
As mentioned in the previous chapter five, embedded systems most often have compu-
tational constraints. ThereGate is no exception. When ThereGate was under Nessus ex-
ternal network vulnerability scan or Ettercap DoS attack, it crashed several times, re-
booting the whole machine. Thus, ThereGate, with its current hardware, is prone to DoS 
type of attacks, having an impact on the availability of the system. The solution to this 
problem is to use white and black lists in firewalls or other traffic limitations, and en-
sure that the programs used in ThereGate are optimised. 
The other tests that measured protocols were done with Ettercap, which turned out 
to be a very powerful tool. The DoS attack of Ettercap was used against each compo-
nent of the system, resulting in different levels of DoS. 
6.3.9 Synopsis of the test results 
Each interface can be divided into components that it consists of. These are the most 
critical parts of the interfaces, and of the whole system, and the ones that must be pro-
tected. For example, HTTPS interface includes TCP/IP, HTTP and TLS protocols, and 
of course, a server and a client. The server, for one part, consists of configurations, used 
programming language and so forth.  
In order to make the results more compact and understandable, they can be divided 
into three groups: 
1. Configuration flaws 
2. Software flaws 
3. Implementation flaws  
Table 6.6 presents the most critical flaws divided into three groups for each inter-
face. To be said, this table does not include all flaws found, just the most critical ones.  
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Table 6.6. Summary of test results divided into groups. 
Target Configuration flaw Software flaw Implementation 
flaw 
ThereGate: 
-HTTP 
-TCP/IP 
- TLS 
-Apache 
-PHP 
CherryPy listens port 8080. 
Reveals too much information 
(SSL, SSH, HTTP Servers). 
Only one user – root. 
Apache: allow from all. 
PHP: session management: 
user id in plaintext. 
TSL weak cipher & version 
support. 
Easter Eggs 
Apache version 2.2 
vulnerabilities. 
PHP version 5.3 
vulnerabilities. 
SSL version 
No client auhentica-
tion. 
No CA certifications. 
IP and TCP protocols 
fail.  
HTTP protocol fail-
ure. 
Computational con-
strains, DoS 
ARP poisoning 
OES: 
-HTTP  
-TCP/IP 
- Jetty 
- WebShpere 
- Apache 
Unnecessary services and 
open ports: jetdirect, ... 
Too many services are visible. 
Reveals too much information 
(HTTP, WebShpere, TNS). 
LDAP NULL BASE Search Ac-
cess. 
Web Server prone to HTML 
injections, XSS attacks. 
Apache Byte Range 
DoS. 
Mort Bay Jetty 
Multiple XSS . 
WebSphere. 
IP and TCP protocols 
fail. 
HTTP protocol fail-
ure. 
No CA certifications. 
No encryption 
Weak client authen-
tication 
ARP poisoning 
ICS: 
- ARP 
- TCP/IP 
- SQL Server 
Too many services are visible. 
Microsoft Windows SMB Null 
Session Authentication.  
Microsoft SQL 
Server: remote 
code execution. 
ARP and IP protocols 
fail. 
OPC-UA TCP issues 
No encryption 
No authentication 
ARP poisoning 
Agent: 
- TCP/IP 
- Apache 
Unnecessary services and 
open ports: apj13, ... 
Too many services are visible. 
Apache Tomcat contains ex-
ample files. 
Web Server uses plain text 
authentication forms. 
Apache Tomcat 7.x 
vulnerabilities. 
ARP poisoning 
 
As can be seen, configurations are extremely important, being able to make a good 
system insecure, and vice versa. With good configuration and a firewall, it is possible to 
create a good level of security, and manage vulnerabilities that cannot be fixed by, for 
example, hiding them. Another very important factor is to keep the software updated 
and patched. The milestones of the whole ICT system are communication protocols. If 
they fail, so will the applications using them. 
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7 BEST PRACTICES SECURITY CHECK LIST  
This chapter sums up the obtained results in the form of a best practices security check 
list that can be used for evaluating information security of a home automation system. 
Finding an apt solution for information security can be hard, but on the other hand, 
companies working in Smart Grid cannot afford to ignore it.  
Automation systems just like Smart Grid are utilizing ICTs. Thus, the best informa-
tion security practices for the Smart Grid follow closely those of a normal ICT envi-
ronment. However, every situation is unique, and possesses characteristic features that 
affect what can be done and what cannot. For example, updating software and OS in 
automation environment can be impossible. The key for securing any system is to know 
the goals – what are the objectives of information security – and its targets – what are 
the assets of the system that needs to be protected. When these two have been deter-
mined, it is easier to identify the most critical parts of the system.  
In order to keep the whole process under control, the system should be divided into 
smaller pieces, segments and go systemically through each component, one at a time. 
Also, once a good configuration, for example, to switch has been made, it can be ap-
plied to other switches and make it into an organization´s security policy. 
7.1 Customer Domain – HEMS/Home automation: 
A crucial part of HEMS security is the customers‘ awareness, and how well their com-
puters are secured. Companies should try to provide at least some sort of a best practices 
checklist for the end users to follow. Also, companies should concentrate more on de-
fault settings, and realize the laziness of human beings; default passwords, for instance, 
are not always changed. One could say that the three most critical software to secure a 
user‘s computer are a firewall, virus scanner, and correct configuring of the web 
browser. Whereas the firewall and virus scanners are familiar to most of the people, 
browser settings are not. Plug-ins, like Flash, make things even more complicated. Yet, 
it is commonly known that most of the Internet attacks of today exploit the client side 
software vulnerabilities [67].  
According to CERT-FI, it is necessary for an active Internet user to save one´s regis-
tration information. This information includes the address of the site, username, pass-
word (not to be located in computers hard-drive, or encrypted), email address, and in-
formation if a credit card has been used or not. This way, when sites are penetrated, one 
can easily see what information has been compromised and so forth. [103.] However, 
when conducting a list including all your information and passwords, the issue is where 
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to keep it. There are tools for managing passwords that could be one solution for man-
aging the information.   
This checklist is designed for companies and entities that are providing home auto-
mation related services or equipment like ThereGate in customer domain. Working in 
this domain is probably the most challenging from the information security point of 
view as there are many interconnection points and most of all, as public interfaces are 
often needed. Also, the competition in this domain is hard leaving very little resources 
to information security aspects.  
The equipment are most often used by normal people. For this reason, this checklist 
also tries to take into account the special features that the variety of people brings along. 
Following best practice security checklist has been made from the findings of this thesis 
as well as using many other best practices lists. 
 
Critical control 1: Physical security 
 
The purpose of this control 
Physical interfaces are among the easiest of ways to bypass other security features that 
the equipment might have. According to studies made, two-thirds of all USB memory 
sticks can infected with malware! [118]. As the home automation devices will be at the 
customer´s domain, and used by customers as well, devices with external physical ports, 
such as USB ports, will have to face this problem. 
 
How to implement 
Companies making home automation devices should think which features they want to 
offer, and then think how they can make it safe. There are different ways of approaching 
physical safety. For example, using seals is one way to prevent, or at least prove that the 
equipment has been used incorrectly. Other solutions try to monitor which devices are 
connected, or restrict how and what it is possible to do via physical ports. One way to 
shrink the time window of a possible attack is to force a company´s own firmware once 
a day.  
 
How to test 
Below it is presented how to check, which interfaces or devices are used in the system. 
Additionally, by using software such as arpwatch, it is possible to monitor unknown 
mac-ip pairs that have been connected to the system [119].   
 In Windows: devcon listclass usb or wmic cpi list brief 
 In Linux: lsusd or dmesg | tail 
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Critical control 2: Limitation of services and open ports  
 
The purpose of this control 
Unnecessary open ports and provided services are serious threats to any system – to 
Smart Grid too. Limiting the number of available services and open ports decreases the 
attack surface of the system, making it more compact, and easier to defend. Especially 
DNS, file and print servers, SSH and such, need to have good reasons for why they are 
enabled [97]. No server should be provided in the spirit that it might be used at some 
point. As OSs, like Windows, and a great number of other software open many unnec-
essary ports and services as a default installation, this control needs to be done to every 
system. As a side result of this control, deeper understanding, and a state of awareness 
of the system is gained. 
 
How to implement 
To perform this control there are many different routes to follow. OSs have integrated 
features, like netstat, that can be used to monitor which ports are open, and what ser-
vices are provided. There are also software, like Nmap, that can be used to scan the sys-
tem from inside and from outside to monitor, and learn what things are visible to net-
work [85]. It is important to make a baseline and use these tools frequently to compare 
the results against the baseline. 
 
How to test 
A few commands from the above mentioned tools are presented below. 
 In Windows: netstat –a or netstat –r or netstat –a –n | findstr LISTENIGN 
 In Linux: lsof –in or ps-al or netstat 
 With Nmap: nmap –p 1-65535 –T4 –A –v <IP> 
 
Critical control 3: Up-to-date software  
 
The purpose of this control 
Using up-to-date software is almost a truism in a normal ICT environment of today. 
However, in a traditional automation system, where updates are not installed frequently, 
and where old OSs are still used, using updated software is rarer. In a home automation 
environment, where public Internet is a part of the architecture, and new techniques are 
used, installing security updates as soon as they are release is a critical factor. Thus, 
updating circles are faster too, and it is important to design the system to be flexible in 
this matter.  
 
How to implement 
There are many ways to monitor, which versions of software are used in the computer. 
OSs, as well as external software, provide means to do that. 
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How to test 
A few ways of finding out information about software are presented below. 
 About Windows OS: C:\>systeminfo | findstr /C:"OS" 
 About Linux OS: cat /proc/version and cat /etc/banner 
 About PHP (linux): /usr/bin/php-cgi --version  
 Nmap and Nessus scans 
 
Critical control 4: Secure default configuration and installation 
 
The purpose of this control 
Home automation devices and software will be at customer domain and most often also 
used by normal people. So far, the default settings of these kinds of commercial devices 
and software have been concentrating on the easiness of use and deploy rather than se-
curity. However, most of the people do not change default settings, like passwords, 
making these devices and software easy targets for adversaries.  
 
How to implement 
Instead of focusing solely in the easiness of installation and implementation, companies 
should concentrate also to the security of default settings and installation process. For 
example, forcing to change default passwords to ones strong enough in installation 
process is one way to improve security. Companies must recognise and understand the 
nature of people, and take responsibility of the information security of the equipment. 
 
Critical control 5: Two-way authentication 
 
The purpose of this control 
With authenticating both ends of communication, better security is provided. Ensuring 
that both parties of communication are who they say to be, is crucial, especially in envi-
ronment where better security is required, like Smart Grid environment. [120; 121.] 
Given the recent development, it is probable that smart phones will also be used in 
Smart Grid environment. This creates more challenges to design and deploy secure au-
thentication process. Authenticating only server side makes the connection more prone 
to attacks such as MITM and pharming. These attacks if successful could have devastat-
ing consequences to whole Smart Grid.  
 
How to implement 
Basically, secure client side authentication requires the use of digital signatures and a 
certificate issuance scheme, or two-factor authentication for individual user level au-
thentication [120]. Using commercial CAs is not always the best solution given the re-
cent events of hacked CAs. Better solution for home automation environment could be 
using SPKI, for instance. In web based authentication SSL should always be used and 
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HTTP basic should be replaced with HTTP digestive. Also, the authentication process 
must be done easy enough to adopt and maintenance, so that it will not be bypassed. 
 Support client certificates with hardware, like TPM  
 In forms: 
o  Use always HTTP POST when transmitting credentials 
o Use ‗TYPE=PASSWORD‘ 
 Allow only strong enough passwords 
o Passwords absolute minimum length is nine character 
o Passwords have special characters, upper, and lower case letter and num-
bers 
 Limit the usage of same password with expiration policy 
 Limit the number of subsequent unsuccessful authentication tries, for example 
o After ten times, lock the username for half an hour 
 
Critical control 6: Secure session management 
 
The purpose of this control 
One of the most common vulnerabilities of web-based systems is insecure session man-
agement [122, p 2]. Vulnerabilities in this process are most often serious as they can 
allow adversary to steal sensitive information, like sessionID and impersonate user. Us-
ing encryption is important and gives more security, but cannot fix all problems: vulner-
abilities in session management can traverse encryption [122, p 25]. As automation 
equipment can provide web UI for customers to manage the equipment, for instance, 
this control is applicable for many companies in Smart Grid environment.  
 
How to implement  
There are different methods that can be used for session management. Each of these 
methods can be made reasonable secure with intelligent design. But on the other hand, 
with negligence and incompetence each can be insecure [122, p 4]. One of the most 
important things in secure session management is the management of sessionID. Choos-
ing a long enough, 256 bits, and random sessionID protects the system against brute 
force attacks, for instance [123]. Using best practise security list gives excellent starting 
point and helps avoiding most common mistakes. 
 Make sure that the sessionID is random and long enough, 256 bits 
 Check that the sessionID changes with every login 
 Check that sessionID desolates when logout 
 Make sure that no user information can be derived from sessionID 
 Use strong encryption on all transmissions 
 Store only the Session ID on the Client Side 
 Perform sanity checks to detect session hijacking 
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Critical control 7: Secure communication encryption 
 
The purpose of this control 
One of the easiest ways for the adversary to learn something about the system is eaves-
dropping, if no encryption is used. SSL is an industry, and de facto standard for estab-
lishing an encrypted link between client and server. However, there are vulnerabilities 
even in SSL as well as and in other encryption methods, which adversaries exploit to 
attack against the system. Most commonly, these attacks result in DoS types of situa-
tions, but other more severe situations are also possible. In Smart Grid environment, 
there is plenty of sensitive information that needs to be transmitted in an encrypted 
form. If information is transmitted, for example, from meters to HEMS in plain text, it 
is very easy to spoof. 
 
How to implement  
The milestone in securing that the encryption used is strong enough, is to disable the 
support of old versions, and making sure that only high level encryption versions are 
used. To improve security even more, different levels of security features, such as IPSec 
and TLS, should be used. 
 
How to test 
Presented below is a simple way to check if a weak version of SSL is supported by the 
system:   
 Using command: openssl s_client -connect target:port -ssl2 –cipher 
'LOW:NULL:aNULL:EXPORT' [113, pp. 34-35]. 
 
Critical control 8: Secure software configuration  
 
The purpose of this control 
Software configurations are an essential part of any system´s information security. In a 
home automation environment, especially configuring web servers needs to be done 
with the utmost care. One example of the importance of configuration is information 
disclosure: giving out detailed information about the system may help an adversary to 
find vulnerabilities from the system. In a home automation environment, where infor-
mation security is somewhat newer thing than in a normal ICT system, there might be 
more zero-day vulnerabilities. Information disclosure does not only apply to servers 
telling too much information about services, but also error messages and such. From a 
detailed error message, great deal of information can be attained.  
 
How to implement  
The basic things to do are to change the default passwords as soon as possible, and de-
lete example files from the server. However, it is necessary that before installing any 
software, especially a server, to familiarize yourself with articles on common configura-
 82 
tion flaws and best practice lists. Avoiding most common flaws and configuring the 
server according to the best practice gives an excellent starting point to make a baseline, 
which can be used to monitor changes. [97.] Using vulnerability scanners like Nessus or 
w3af will also give hints of bad configurations. Presented below are a few basic things 
about configuring software: 
 Use best practice lists to help setting the configurations of servers 
o Apache: http://www.petefreitag.com/item/505.cfm 
o PHP: http://www.cyberciti.biz/tips/php-security-best-practices-
tutorial.html 
 Change default passwords as soon as possible 
 Delete example files from the server 
 Delete other than necessary parts of the service 
 Use generic error message that does not reveal too much information 
 Make sure that the server runs with limited rights 
o Apply sandboxes 
 Turn off directory browsing 
o Apache .htaccess file: Option –indexes 
o Especially cgi-bin 
 
Critical control 9: Validate information 
 
The purpose of this control 
Home automation devices are part of Smart Grid, and many other services or operations 
may be relying on their information. Especially when altering such information could be 
profitable for customers, companies must ensure the integrity of information. If the in-
formation that comes from devices cannot be trusted, it will ultimately affect to entire 
Smart Grid.  
Validating information is also very important way of improving a systems security. 
Without proper input validation, the adversary might gain access to ―deeper‖ parts of 
the system, conducting attacks like SQL injections and such. This might lead, for in-
stance, to loss of sensitive information. Validation of input is also a critical part of any 
web application of today for the reasons stated above.    
 
How to implement 
The key of validation of information is to check all information coming from users or 
equipment consists of only accepted characters. Applying white-lists is also one way to 
control the information.   
 Check that all information coming from users/equipment consists only of ac-
cepted characters (including forms, http-headers, cookies and url-parametres) 
 Use white lists  
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Critical control 10: Secure control of information 
 
The purpose of this control 
In many ICT systems, information needs to be kept in databases where it can be distrib-
uted to legal parties. The recent events of hacked web servers give excellent example of 
the importance of secure control of information. In home automation environment a lot 
of sensitive information is transferred and databases used. Vulnerabilities in this process 
may result in loss of sensitive information, for instance. 
 
How to implement 
The starting point of secure information control is to use always encryption when sensi-
tive information is transmitted. Also, asking and storing only necessary information is a 
good starting point. Sensitive information, like passwords should not be kept in plain-
text format, but instead use cryptographic hash functions, like MD5 or SHA1 and salt 
combined with a password. Taking safety backups from the database and keeping it in 
safe location, is also, good practise and helps to act in cases of database penetrations, for 
instance. One easy way to increase user security is to confirm all passwords manage-
ment changes using, for example registered email address. [103.] 
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8 CONCLUSION 
The two goals set to this thesis were to introduce a way to analyse and test information 
security of Smart Grid ICT implementation and to provide best practice security check-
list for entities in the home automation environment. The results from the analysis and 
testing phase point out the necessity of information security analysis. As it turned out, 
each of the ICT equipment has information security issues, some more than others. The 
most common vulnerabilities came from software configuration and using vulnerable 
versions of software.  
The most crucial equipment in the demonstration environment is ThereGate: it is the 
customer´s UI to the entire Smart Grid. However, the information security of ThereGate 
has serious shortages, which can be used to exploit the equipment. If the security of 
ThereGate is compromised, it will affect the whole system. Therefore, securing There-
Gate should be priority number one. However, it should be noted that the used There-
Gate is a development version and is therefore not intended for production. It is prob-
able that some ISP or DSO will own ThereGate and, consequently is also responsible 
for securing it. However, in order to a gain good security level, companies must work 
together. 
The best practice security checklist takes into account the special characteristics of 
the home automation environment in Smart Grid. The most important asset of the sys-
tem is information, which makes protecting it the main goal. This requires better secu-
rity methods, like two-way authentication or two-factor authentication as well as using 
secure encryption versions. However, companies working in the home automation envi-
ronment also have to take into account the human factor and make sure that every cos-
tumer, regardless of her or his knowledge of technology, can securely use the services 
and equipment provided. 
Smart Grid environment also needs stricter requirements from the used protocols 
and specifications. It is clear, that as long as standards and other only recommend, not 
require information security methods, like encryption and such, they will not be used 
and thus, make the system more vulnerable. Stricter policies and requirements are 
needed.   
Smart Grid is a complex and a huge environment. This thesis only scratched the sur-
face of this iceberg, concentrating in certain parts of it. It is clear that more studies on 
information security are required in order to create a secure Smart Grid.  
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Figure A.1. A part of Nessus scan report from ThereGate.  
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Figure A.3. A part of Nessus scan report from ICS. 
 
 
Figure A.4. A part of Nessus scan report from Agent/Northbound. 
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